Fairness in Anglo and Latin American Commercial Adjudication by Kozolchyk, Boris
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 2 Latin American Commercial Law Symposium Article 3
1-1-1979
Fairness in Anglo and Latin American Commercial
Adjudication
Boris Kozolchyk
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boris Kozolchyk, Fairness in Anglo and Latin American Commercial Adjudication , 2 B.C. Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 219 (1979), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol2/iss2/3
Fairness in Anglo and Latin American 
Commercial Adjudication * 
by Boris Kozolchyk** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whatever the meaning of fairness for the moral philosopher may be, legal 
and particularly judicial perceptions of commercial fairness fall into iden-
tifiable patterns when examined compa~~tively. This article explores the 
meaning of fairness in Anglo and Latin American commercial adjudication 
and summarizes some of the findings of a more comprehensive study to be 
published in the near future.' 
The initial segment of this study focused on the development of the law of 
usury in two European jurisdictions, England and Spain. Usury was chosen as 
the first study because this branch of the law has dealt, since ancient times, 
with the determination of what is the fair price, if any, for money lent. The 
usury study suggested the presence of three standards in varying degrees of 
'Copyright 1979 Boris Kozolchyk. 
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predominance during each stage of the development of the law of usury. A 
"brotherly" standard (Fl) required that the lender treat the borrower as if he 
were his brother, which in most instances meant that the loan had to be in-
terest free. A "market" standard (F2) required that the borrower be charged 
the same rate of interest that other lenders customarily, that is to say, when 
acting as businessmen or with a view to their own advantage, charged their 
borrowers in their particular market. And a "stranger" standard (F3), which 
did not impose any restrictions on the manner in which a borrower could be 
treated, thereby equating his status to that of a non-member of the lender's 
family, religion, nation or marketplace. Usually, this meant that the borrower 
could be charged whatever rate the lender imposed. 2 
Subsequent studies on other areas of commer,ciallaw adjudication (broadly 
defined)3 confirmed the presence of the above standards, although their 
prevalence, as with the law of usury, varied from one representative jurisdic-
tion to another. The following sections will describe the various versions of the 
fairness standards which prevail in United States statutory and decisional law 
and in representative Latin American jurisdictions. When required by the 
comparison, historical or prototype versions of fairness standards will be used. 
II. A PROTOTYPE VERSION OF (Fl): 
JEWISH MEDIEVAL COMMERCIAL RESPONSA 
From the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, at a time at which trade across 
national boundaries as well as from one city or trading center in Europe, 
North Africa and the Middle East to another was a very risky undertaking! 
only those traders who trusted each other as brothers could count on long 
standing profitable relationships. Trust then was predicated upon a sense of 
religious and professional brotherhood, which was notable among Arab and 
Jewish merchants. 5 Jewish medieval responsa, or answers to complex legal 
questions submitted to learned rabbis or Talmudic scholars by the judges in 
2. The decision to ~tudy usury as a representative sample of the fairness criteria in due course 
lead to B. NELSON. THE IDEA OF USURY (1969). Nelson's painstaking description of the evolution 
of the meaning of usury from its tribual brotherhood origins to its modern conception of a 
"universal otherhood," including the changing meaning of "brotherhood" was very helpful in 
the formulation of the legal standards. 
3. For purposes of this article "commercial" adjudication includes the transactions normally 
found in commercial codes in civil law countries. Thus, in addition to transactions covered by the 
U.C.C., it includes the sale of real property with an intent to profit, commission agency, 
brokerage, business associations and fiduciary transactions. 
4. For a description of the perils in Mediterranean trade, see a collection of translated 
medieval letters in S.D. GOITEIN, LETTERS OF MEDIEVAL JEWISH TRADERS (1973). For a general 
description of trade conditions, customary terms and practices see 1-2 S.D. GOITEIN, A 
MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY - THEJEWISH COMMUNmES OF THE ARAB WORLD AS PORTRAYED IN 
THE DOCUMENTS OF THE ARAB GENIZA (1967). For a description of northwestern European 
Jewish trade, see 1-2 I.A. AGUS, URBAN CIVILIZATION IN PRE-CRUSADE EUROPE (1965) (see 
especially 67, 78, 88) [hereinafter cited as Agus I or II). 
5. For an insightful account of the meaning and role of "brotherhood," especially in instilling 
trust among Jewish and Arab merchants see, Goitein, FOT77UJ1 Friendship in the Medieval Near East, 
15 PROC. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC., 484 (1971). 
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the various communities, clearly reflected the influence of the brotherhood no-
tion. Thus, 
whenever a Jew lost any money or property either by accident or 
through thievery . . . and another Jew found his property in the 
hands of a non Jew and bought it from him (even if) he did not know 
that his property originally belonged to a Jew, then if the original 
owner appeared and recognized his goods, the purchaser must 
return the goods to the original owner and is entitled to recoup only 
his disbursement. 6 
Similarly, and in order to prevent unscrupulous gentile creditors - pledgees 
from taking advantage of necessitous Jewish pledgors, a responsum recalled a 
restrictive ordinance that no one shall redeem (from a non Jew) the pledge of a 
fellow Jew. 7 
A Jewish merchant's business relationship with a non Jew was protected by 
bans and interdictions restraining other Jewish merchants from interfering 
with such a relationship (maarufia).8 Jewish co-adventurers or passengers in the 
same commercial voyage frequently protected a colleague's weak and 
necessitous dependents in the event of his death or incapacity by "picking up 
his bundle,"9 i. e., transacting business on his behalf and turning the profits 
over to his surviving family. By encouraging trust, the brotherly standard also 
encouraged an efficient and highly predictable method of doing business, 
where formalities were rarely of the essence. Reliance on a brethren's word, 
and on his telling the truth, was a central feature not only of business practice 
but also of dispute settlement, since it generally was centered on the decissory 
oath.lO 
The Jewish medieval version of (Fl) assumed that the trade relationships 
which gave rise to disputes arose primarily and preponderantly among a 
relatively small number of merchants, i. e., brethren in the kinship or religious 
sense. The protection of the maarufia (exclusive dealership with gentiles) 
betrayed the scarcity and economic value oftrade with non Jews. Yet, could a 
rule that required the original owner's recovery of lost or stolen property from 
a bona fide purchaser by merely paying the latter's costs of acquisition be ac-
ceptable where bona fide purchases are not only constantly being made but 
also encouraged? What if the bona fide purchasers themselves already had 
become liable to sub-purchasers for the delivery of the same item at a higher 
price than that offered as reimbursement by the original owner? Should not 
6. Responsum Shao.re Zedek 32 n.20, translated in Agus I, supra note 4, at 134-36. 
7. Responsum of Rabbenu Gershom, in Agus I, supra note 4, at 206-07. 
8. Responsum of Rashi, in Agus I, supra note 4, at 244. 
9. Ano'!)lmous Responsumfrom Sefer Hadinim of Rabbi Judah ha Cohen, in Agus I, supra note 4, at 
80-82. . 
10. For instances of reliance on the decissory oath in the Responsa, see Agus I, supra note 4, at 
61; Augus II, supra note 4, at 48,440; for a comparative evaluation of the oath in the Jewish and 
Islamic traditions, see Pedersen, Der Eid bei den Semiten, in Seinem Verhaltnis zu Verwandten 
Erscheinungen sowie die Stellung des Eides im Islam 95-96 (1914). 
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the bona fide purchaser in such a situation be protected in his possession or 
reimbursed for his damages including his lost profits? Or, could the protection 
of maarufia be reconciled with a policy of encouragement of free trade and 
competition? Where, as in present day developed market economies, trade is 
among "non brethren" in a religious or kinship sense it would be unrealistic 
to impose brotherly duties on such a restricted basis. Whatever brotherly 
duties the legal systems choose to impose must therefore be predicated on 
broader or universalistic grounds. 
III. CONTEMPORARY VERSIONS OF (F1) 
A. Trustees in u.s. Law 
A contemporary version of (F1) is found in the United States law that sets 
forth the duties of trustees and of parties whose superior knowledge or 
economic power places them in a position of dominance over other parties to 
the transaction. Unlike an ordinary contracting party, the trustee cannot 
claim that the absence of consideration for his management of the trust affairs 
is a valid excuse against the enforcement of a beneficiary's equitable rights and 
interests in the trust. 11 In transactions with third parties the trustee's diligence 
is measured against a "prudent man" standard; whereas in transactions with 
the beneficiary himself, or those involving the trustee's acquisition of trust 
property, the standard is much stricter. As stated in 1948 by the New York 
Surrogate Court in In ReJames Estate: "When, however, the trustee acts in his 
own interest in connection with the performance of his duties as a trustee, the 
standard of behavior becomes more rigorous. In such a case, his interest must 
yield to that of the beneficiaries. "12 
B. Parties With Superior Knowledge in U. S. Law 
In Re James Estate indicates that the rigorous standard described above ap-
plies not only to trustees but also to other parties, e.g. , attorneys in relation to 
their clients, whose functions are fiduciary because of their "superior 
knowledge" or of their transactional "dominance. "13 Approximately twenty 
years ago, decisions began to appear with increasing frequency in the United 
States which also placed sellers and financiers of consumer transactions in a 
fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary position vis-a-vis ignorant consumers. For exam-
ple in Williams v. Wallcer Thomas Furniture CO.,14 a case involving a furniture 
retailer as seller and a welfare recipient as a buyer of consumer goods, the 
11. G. C. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS (1973); sualso RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS U 28-32 (1959). 
12. In reJames' Estate, 86 N.Y.S.2d 78, 89-90 (1948). 
13. Id. at 87-88. 
14. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia defined unconscionability 
as "the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party. "15 The court elaborated on what it meant by an absence of meaningful 
choice stating: 
The manner in which the contract was entered into is also relevant to 
this consideration. Did each party to the contract considering his ob-
vious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to un-
derstand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hid-
den in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sale prac-
tices?16 
Another decision found inherent unconscionability and unfairness when the 
contractual weakness of the consumer resulted in a purchase price two and one 
half times the market value of the items purchased. 17 
C. Mitigation of Damages in U. S. Law 
The preceding unconscionability cases were not the only instances in which 
merchants were made to act in a brotherly fashion; courts in the United States 
long have encouraged the mitigation of damages caused by breach of contract 
between buyers and sellers. IS Sellers whose goods are unjustifiably rejected by 
15. /d. at 449. 
16. /d. at 449-50. 
17. In Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), the New Jersey trial 
court held that a contract for the sale of a freezer priced at more than two and one half times its 
market value was unenforceable because of fraud in its inception and because of the inherent un-
conscionability. On appeal, only the issue of fraud was decided, 108 N.J. Super 129, 260 A.2d 
244 (App. Div. 1969); nonetheless the price charged had clearly shocked the court's conscience. 
103 N.J. Super. at 504, 247 A.2d at 703. See also Central Budget Corporation v. Sanchez 53 
Misc.2d 630,279 N.Y.S.2d 391,392 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967) (which stands for the proposition 
that excessively high prices may trigger the application of U .C.C. § 2-302); Toker v. Westerman 
113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (App. Div. 1970); and Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 
A.2d 640 (1971). 
18. See, e.g., Sands v.Taylor, 5 Johns. Cas. 393, 4 Am. Dec. 374 (New York Sup. Ct. 1810) 
where the buyer had refused to receive a substantial part of seller's shipment of wheat. The seller 
gave notice to the buyer that unless he received and paid for the entire wheat shipment the 
residue would be sold at public auction and the buyer would be held responsible for any defi-
ciency. The New York court held that the sale of the wheat by the seller was not a waiver of his 
rights, the vendor being, by the refusal of the buyer to accept the wheat, at liberty to abandon it, 
or dispose of it bonafide as the buyer's agent to the best advantage. 5 Johns. Cas. at 405, 4 Am. 
Dec. at 375. Spencer, J., analyzed the vendor's position as follows: 
they were, by necessity, made the defendants' trustees to manage it; and being thus 
constituted trustees, or agents, of the defendants, they must either abandon the prop-
erty to destruction, by refusing to have any concern with it, or take a course more for 
the advantage of the defendants by selling it. There is a strong analogy between this 
case and that of the assured, in case of an abandonment. ... In both cases, the party in 
possession is to be considered an agent to the other party, from necessity. 
5 Johns. Cas. at 405-06, 4 Am. Dec. at 377. It is interesting that courts in as unsophisticated a 
commercial jurisdiction as Arizona was in 1892, had adopted the following rule: 
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buyers, or buyers whose payment of the purchase price is wrongly refused by 
sellers, are strongly encouraged to sell to or to buy from substitute parties, col-
lecting as damages the difference between the price of the substitute and of the 
goods in the original transaction. 19 The mitigation of damages caused by the 
other contracting party is reminiscent of the Jewish merchant's behavior when 
picking up his colleague's "bundle. "20 However, unlike the Jewish medieval 
trader, the mitigating United States seller or buyer is not an altruist. Far from 
being forced to suffer a possible loss or detriment in his mitigation, courts and 
legislatures in the United States have sought, punctiliously, to place the "ag-
grieved" party in the same position he would have been if the contract had 
been fully performed. 21 In addition, by utilizing his assets in a "going con-
cern" fashion, rather than by having them immobilized until final adjudica-
tion of the breach of contract or measure of damages, the "aggrieved" party's 
profitability increases over the long run. On the other hand, the United States 
merchant, just as the Jewish medieval trader, must concern himself with the 
other party's losses when required to exercise "reasonable commercial judg-
ment for the purposes of avoiding loss. "22 
In sum, two basic versions of (Ft) can be discerned: the strict trustee ver-
sion and the common benefit version. The first and strictest applies to trustees 
and to contracting parties acting with superior knowledge or enjoying a trans-
actional dominance over weaker parties, and who are in a position to take ad-
vantage of such superior knowledge or contractual strength. This version 
demands that the trustee or dominating party act in the best interests of the 
beneficiary or weaker party. The second and less demanding standard sets 
For a breach of a valid contract of sale by the vendee, in failing to accept the contract 
price, the vendor may treat the contract as a complete sale, and at his option either store 
the goods as the property of the vendee, or within a reasonable time resell in the open 
market. If he held the property for the vendee he may recover the full contract price. If 
he resells, the law deems him agent of the vendee, and he may apply the proceeds as 
payment pro tanto and, if less than the contract price, recover the difference. He may 
also treat the contract as executory, and the sale as not having vested title in the vendee, 
and retain property as his own, and may sue and recover any loss of profit had the con-
tract price been paid. This would be the difference between the contract price and the 
market value at the time and place of delivery. 
Slaughter v. Marlow, 3 Ariz. 429, 31 P. 547 (1892). 
19. See Mays Mills v. McRae, 187 N.C. 707, 122 S.E. 762 (1924) (where it was held that the 
recipient of the repudiation should not continue with his performance if doing so would increase 
damages); see also U.C.C. S 2-709(1)(b) (which requires the seller to employ a reasonable effort to 
resell the goods at a reasonable price or to prove that circumstances indicate that such efforts 
would be unavailing, to be entitled to the action on the price or the similar rule on the buyer's 
right to specific performance or replevin); U.C.C. S 2-716. 
20. See the language by Spencer, J., quoted in note 18 supra where he draws an analogy be-
tween the "necessity" of an assured in the abandonment of goods and that of the repudiating 
party, both requiring in his view the innocent party's agency or trusteeship with regard to the 
goods. 
21. Su,e.g., seller's remedy of damages under U.C.C. S 2-708(1)(2). 
22. U.t.C. S 2-704(2). 
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forth a duty of care which is not at the expense of one's assets. On the con-
trary, it presupposes a common benefit, or altruism motivated by self interest. 
It generally is applicable to merchants and to situations where both parties 
stand to gain from the brotherly conduct. 
D. Trustees and Superior Knowledge in Mexican and Costa Rican Law 
Latin Americans rightly are regarded as warm and hospitable people. In ad-
dition, in this writer's experience, family and friendship imply a deeper emo-
tional and financial commitment in Latin America than is normally the case in 
other, more economically developed regions. Yet, (Fl) seems, on the whole, 
absent from Latin American commercial adjudication. 
Mexico is one of the few Latin American jurisdictions to have adopted the 
equivalent of the Anglo-American trust. 25 Mexican statutory rules provide 
that a trustee must discharge his trusteeship in accordance with instructions 
provided in the trust instrument, and, in following these instructions, he must 
have the diligence of "a good father of family."24 According to a leading 
authority, the "good father of family" standard was intended as a contem-
porary version of the Roman standard for" bonae fidei negotia, " which applied 
when, regardless of express stipulations, the parties were bound to employ a 
high level of diligence (summa u omnis diligmtia).25 Implicit in the standard ap-
plied to the bonaefidei negotia was a healthy exercise of the obligor's discretion. 
This discretion was foreign to the so-called stricti juris negotia where the main 
question was the extent to which the obligor violated explicit instructions. 26 
23. On Mexican law see Ley General de TItulos y Operaciones de Credito de 26 de agosto de 
1932 [hereinafter cited as Mexican L TOC] (wherein the bulk of present statutory rules on trusts 
are found), and its 1926 antecedents, Ley de Bancos de Fideicomiso, de 30 dejunio de 1926, and 
Ley General de Instituciones de Credito y Establecimientos Bancarios, de 31 de agosto de 1926. 
A very influential Panamanian draft of a trust law was prepared in 1920 by the distinguished 
jurist R. ALFARO, PROYECTO DE LEY DE FIDEICOMISO (Panama 1920). Statutory rules on the trust 
are found, among others, in Costa Rica, Ley de Fideicomisos de 13 de noviembre de 1937, and 
more recently in the CODIGO DE COMERCIO DE 1964 arts. 633-62 (Costa Rica); in Ecuador, Ley 
General de Bancos, 17 de marzo de 1948 (Ecuador); in EI Salvador, CODIGODE COMERCIO, Lib. 
IV, tit. VII, cap. VII, (1970); in Guatemala, Ley de Bancos, No. 315 de 5 de diciembre de 1946, 
CODIGO DE COMMERCIO DE 1952 (Guatemala); in Honduras, CODIGO DE COMMERCIO DE 1950 
arts. 1033-62 (Honduras); in Nicaragua, Ley General de Instituciones Bancarias, de 26 de oc-
tubre 1940, reformada por la Ley No. 158 de 4 de agosto de 1941; in Venezuela, Ley de 
Fideicomisos de 25 de julio de 1956. For a survey on Latin American trust legislation, see R. 
BATIZA, EL FEDEICOMISO, TEORIA Y PRACTICA 65-68 (Mexico, D.F., 1973) [hereinafter cited as 
BATlZA]; for earlier surveys, see 3 B. KOZOLCHYK & O. TORREALBA, CURSO DE DERECHO MER-
CANTIL 34-40 (Costa Rica 1968) [hereinafter cited as KOZOLCHYK & TORREALBA]; R. 
GOLDSCHMIDT, EL FIDEICOMISO EN LOS PAISES DE LA AMERICA LATINA, NUEVOS ESTUDIOS DE 
DERECHO COMPARADO 129-161 (Venezuela 1962). 
24. See Mexican LTOC, supra note 23, art. 356; BATIZA, supra note 23, at 179-80. 
25. See BATIZA, supra note 23, at 179-80. . 
26. ]d. 
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An examination of Mexican court decisions reveals that they evaluate the 
trustee's diligence almost exclusively in terms of faithfulness to the letter of the 
settlor's instructions or of numerous administrative regulations rather than on 
what a "good father of family" would have done where discretion could have 
been exercised profitably. 27 Consequently, a Mexican trustee need not act as a 
"good father of family" in buying or selling a given asset if he could show that 
his inaction was dictated by a faithful, if not literal, observance of an ill con-
ceived or drawn instruction or administrative regulation. 28 In contrast with 
U.S. law, the trustee is not encouraged to substitute his professional and more 
immediate knowledge of the circumstances surrounding each act or transac-
tion for that of the settlor or administrative official. 29 
The question then arises of what standard applies to a Mexican trustee who 
enters into a self-interested transaction with his beneficiary or one involving 
beneficiary's assets. In the absence of a specific statutory or administrative 
rule, one can surmise the Mexican legislator's attitude only from the prohibi-
tion that applies to a similar transaction by a guardian: 
Not even with judicial permission, with or without public bidding, 
can the guardian acquire or lease properties of the ward (incompe-
tent), nor enter into any contract with respect to such property for 
himself, his ascendants, his wife,children or brothers or sisters by 
consanguinity or affinity. Should he do so, in addition to the nullity 
of the contract, the act shall be sufficient to cause his removal.30 
Thus, in contrast with the attitude apparent in In ReJames Estate,3! where the 
United States trustee, as a party with superior knowledge, was allowed to deal 
with the property of the beneficiary provided he complied with the strictest 
version of (F1), the Mexican legislature seems unwilling both to trust the 
guardian in st:lf-interested types of transactions, and to use (F1) as a device 
with which to insure that the trust is not misused. 
A 1938 Costa Rican Supreme Court decision provides an illustration of the 
need for an (Fl) standard in transactions where parties of inferior knowledge 
entrust their assets to others of superior knowledge. A Costa Rican notary 
public, who was also an executor (albacea) of an estate, in his role as executor 
sold property of the estate to a third party, and, at the same time, acting as a 
27. See, e.g., Esparza de Sanchez Leonor, Sec. la, [1954] 119-II Semanario 1119; Acosta Sierra 
Francisco, Sec. 2a, [1952] 118-II Semanario 1082. For a discussion of some of the administ~ative 
regulations governing the discretion of Mexican trustees (which according to the L TOC can only 
be banking institutions), see BATIZA. supra note 23, at 207-11. 
28. See BATIZA. supra note 23, at 193-94 (see especially note 359 discussing the curtailing effect 
on an investment trustee's discretion by Mexican banking law). 
29. !d. 
30. C6D1GO CIVIL DE 1928 art. 569 (Mex.). 
31. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
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notary public, executed and issued the notarial or public deed documenting 
the conveyance. 32 The land registrar refused to record the deed because Costa 
Rican notarial law required that a notary who acts as an agent or representa-
tive for the sale of property cannot be, at the same time, the notary public for 
the transaction. 33 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica rejected the 
conflict of interest argument and stated that if the notary gives 
faith of the authenticity of the sales price on the basis of an expert 
witness' appraisal, and refers to the judicial authorization of the sale, 
as well as to his appointment as an executor, we cannot see how the 
notary's impartiality could be compromised, especially since no 
transaction was made on his own behalf or on behalf of his 
relatives. . . . H 
The Supreme Court of Costa Rica did not inquire whether the estate had 
paid higher notarial fees or transactional costs than would have been involved 
had a notary been selected after determining whose fees were the lowest. 35 
Higher fees may well have been avoided if the notary in question was required 
to prove that when undertaking such a self-interested transaction his interest, 
as that of the trustee in In ReJames Estate, unquestionably yielded to that of the 
heirs. 
E. Superior Bargaining Power and Lesion in Mexican Law 
Article 17 of the Mexican Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories 
of 1928 sets forth the doctrine of lesion as follows: 
When any person, taking advantage of the supreme ignorance, 
notorious inexperience or extreme poverty of another, obtains an ex-
cessive profit which is evidently disproportionate to the obligations 
assumed by him, the person damaged has the right to demand the 
recission of the contract and if this is impossible, an equitable reduc-
tion of his obligation .... 36 
In light of such a categorical provision, one could have expected many Walker 
Thomas3 7 type of decisions by Mexico's appellate courts. Yet, very few deci-
32. Ugalde Gamboa y Otro v. Registro Publico de la Propiedad, Suprema Corte Justicia, 
Casacion, Costa Rica, 15 de Agosto, 1938, (1938) II Seminario 1494, reprinted in O.A. SALAS, 
DERECHO NOTARIAL DE CENTROAMERICA Y PANAMA 163·67 (Costa Rica 1973) [hereinafter cited 
as SALAS). 
33. SALAS, supra note 32, at 164. 
34. [d. at 166. 
35. For a typical fee schedule (arancel), see SALAS, supra note 32, at 447-50, where fee schedules 
are set forth in an "up to" (hasta) a maximum amount basis for category of deed or instrument. 
36. V. BAKER, THE CIVIL CODE FOR THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND TERRITORIES OF MEXICO 
481 (0. Schoenrich trans. 1950). 
37. See text accompanying note 14 supra. 
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sions applying Article 17 that have been rendered and their degree of con-
sumer protection is, at best, questionable. According to prevailing doctrinal 
opinion, Mexican Commercial Code Article 385, which precludes the applica-
tion of lesion to "commercial sales, "38 applies to "mixed" transactions, i. e., 
where the sale is commercial for one ofthe parties and "civil" or not commer-
cial for the other. 39 Consequently, the protection of Article 17 is withdrawn 
from consumer purchasers or "from the weaker party when it is most needed, 
i. e. , when he deals with an expert. "40 Moreover, decisions applying Article 17 
(mostly on the sale ofland for a price considerably lower than market) require 
both an "objective" as well as a "subjective" elementY The subjective ele-
ment is determined by the degree of ignorance, inexperience or poverty of the 
weaker party. The objective element refers to the excessive profit in evident 
disproportion to the obligation assumed by the stronger party. 42 Even when a 
Mexican consumer could claim subjective lesion, he would not succeed if he 
cannot prove that the defendant profited excessively. In other words, where 
goods have been sold at a price sufficiently close to market value, the protec-
tion of Article 17 cannot be invoked. This would be true even though payment 
of the purchase price was secured by an excessive or abusive security interest, 
38. C6DIGO DE COMMERICO art. 385 (Mex.) provides: 
Commercial sales shall not be rescinded because oflesion; the aggrieved party however 
may resort, in addition to the corresponding criminal action, to an action on damages 
against the contracting party that acted with evil intent (dolo 0 mo.licia) in entering into 
the contract or in performing under it. 
39. For a comparative discussion of the application of Article 385 of the Mexican Commercial 
Code, set Warren, Mexican Retail Installment Sales Law: A Comparative Study, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
15,53-57 (1962). The view that seems to have been the most influential in Mexico was expressed 
by J. RODRIGUEZ y RODRIGUEZ, CURSO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 9 (Monterrey 1947). But if. R. 
L. MANTILLA MOLINA, DERECHO MERCANTIL 73 (14th ed. Mexico, D. F. 1974) where this highly 
regarded author states: 
Article 1050 of the Mexican Commercial Code (which states that the application of the 
commercial procedural rules depend upon whether the defendant entered into a com-
mercial or civil act) only partially resolves the choice of law question, for it refers only to 
procedural rules; it does not address the choice of substantive law .... In my opinion, 
the obligations of the party for whom the transaction does not entail an act of commerce 
are governed exclusively by the civil law. In order to subject such obligations to the 
commercial law there would have to be an express provision decreeing such a submis-
sion, which in our law does not exist .... 
/d. at 73 (parenthesis added). 
40. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 409 (3d ed. 1970). 
41. See, e.g., Luis Moreno Montes de Oca, Suprema Corte de Justicia, [1966]101 Semanario 
27: "For the existence of lesion, as referred to in Article 17 of the Civil Code of the Federal 
District, it is not enough that there be a notorious disproportion in the price, but it is also 
necessary that there be an abuse of the misery, ignorance or inexperience of the victim." For a 
similar statement see, Antonio Gantus, Suprema Corte deJusticia, [1956]127 Semanario Indices 
807; Maria Concepcion Olguin, Suprema Corte de Justicia, [1970] Jurisprudencia y Tesis 
Sobresalientes 1966-70, Actualizacion II Civil (Mex.). 
42. /d. 
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or the seller knew or should have known that the goods involved should not 
have been purchased on terms agreed upon by the buyer. 43 Finally, despite the 
reference to "extreme poverty" in Article 17, Mexican doctrinal opinion IS 
that economic duress is not within the protection of Article 17. H 
F. Mitigation of Contractual Damages in Costa Rican and Mexican Law 
The Costa Rican and Mexican Supreme Courts have denied until quite 
recently the exercise of the remedy of resale by an aggrieved seller or of cover 
(repurchase) by an aggrieved buyer even when the parties contractually 
stipulated the grounds for rescission. 45 As stated by the Costa Rican Supreme 
Court in a 1945 decision: 
43. The situation described in the principal text is that in the Walker Thomas decision discussed 
in the text accompanying note 14 supra. 
44. E. GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ, DERECHO DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 315-16 (Cajica 5th ed. 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ): 
It is laudable that the legislature try to defend the weak from abuse by the powerful, the 
poor from the rich etc., but it omitted from such a defense those who without being 
poor, ignorant or inexperienced may at a given time face extreme necessity, which will 
allow the other party to take advantage of the situation and obtain a disproportionate 
profit. 
But if. Flores Barroeta, Valuntad Contractual y Derecha Mexicano, BOLETiN DEL INSTITUTO DE 
DERECHO COMPARADO DE MEXICO, Sept.-Dec. 1965, at 699, 719 [hereinafter cited as Flores Bar-
roeta) , who contrasts the rules on economic duress under which French and Mexican courts 
operate as follows: 
Mexican law has not found it necessary to rely on extensive types of interpretation in 
the subject matter of duress because the state of necessity, which French court decisions 
have included under the heading of duress is clearly contemplated by our legislation on 
lesion, which is not the case in French law .... 
Judging from the absence of reported Mexican decisions on the type of necessity described by 
Gutierrez Gonzales, which he distinguished from poverty, it would seem that Mexican Courts 
read Article 17 as he does. For a description of French and German courts pre-World War II 
decisions and attitudes toward economic duress see Dawson, Economic Duress and Fair Exchange in 
French and German Law, 12 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Dawson). 
45. In Costa Rica, the decision which may be the turning point against the doctrine that the 
remedy of resale is only available by court authorization is Cueromat v. Grunhaus Perlmuter, 
Sala de Casacion, 9 de abril de 1953, reprinted in 2 KOZOLCHYK & TORREALBA, supra note 23, at 
115, 129, where the Supreme Court states: 
Plaintiff fulfilled its part of the bargain placing at the disposal of defendant the sold mer-
chandise (at National Customs) ... defendant, since the first shipment, clearly 
repudiated. Such a breach allows plaintiff s claim based on articles 312 of the Commer-
cial Code and 692 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs right is not impaired by his authoriza-
tion of a resale given to a representative agent in Costa Rica because this authorization 
was prompted by defendant's refusal to withdraw the merchandise from customs, and 
faced with custom's warning that the merchandise would have to be sold to pay for 
storage charges .... Thus, when the plaintiff resold to reduce the damages owned by 
defendant he has not waived the right to claim the rescission of the contract and 
damages as provided in Article 692. 
The court referred to the established case law doctrine (since 1917) denying the resale except 
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once again we must set forth the principle that the rescission that 
emerges from rescissory clause, be it the result of an express agree-
ment or of a tacit understanding . . . can never operate with full 
legal import [de plena derecha). The reason is elementary. Neither the 
court, nor the parties are at liberty to ignore the resulting inequity. 
For it would be up to the seller to demand or not to demand before 
the courts the fulfUlment of the obligation (payment of the purchase 
price) or its rescission according to whether the sold property would 
have gone up or down in value. 46 
It should not go unnoticed that the same remedy which the Costa Rican 
Supreme Court considered inequitable is regarded as eminently fair by courts 
in the United States. While the Costa Rican Supreme Court regards as in-
equitable the fact that the aggrieved party has the choice to bring or not to 
bring an action for breach of contract or specific performance (depending 
upon the market value of the goods), this choice is deemed desirable in United 
States common and statutory lawY Moreover, precisely because the possibil-
ity of market price fluctuation is inherent in the delayed choice and with it un-
necessary accumulation of damages, U.S. law encourages the aggrieved party 
to resell or "cover" as quickly as possible. 
In contrast, a 1957 Mexican Supreme Court decision held (as in Costa 
Rica) that a seller's resale upon learning of the buyer's anticipatory breach 
was invalid because it was predicated on "a nonexistent right, (thus) the seller 
was responsible for the buyer's damages as a result of such a resale. ' '48 In 1964 
the Mexican Supreme Court went so far as to hold a seller who resold real 
upon court approval, but stated that since the action on rescission is at root equitable, equity con-
siderations should allow the resale when the circumstances ofthe case warrant it. It is very signifi-
cant that a 1922 decision by the same Supreme Court had referred to the difference between 
Costa Rican and French courts' attitudes toward extra-judicial rescission as caused by the fact 
that French law' 'does not give the creditor a perfect right to rescind and transforms the judge 
who hears the declarative trial, in a sense, into a judge of equity, whereas Art. 692 of the Civil 
Code of Costa Rica is precise and unconditional. ... " Transcript of Sentencia de la Sala de 
Casacion de 19 de Diciembre de 1922, reprinted in P. CASAFONT ROMERO, ENSAYOS DE DERECHO 
CONTRACTUAL 56 (Costa Rica 1956) [hereinafter cited as CASAFONT ROMERO]. It should be 
recalled that a similar justification had been advanced by a Mexican author as to why it was not 
necessary for Mexican courts to act as courts of equity with regard to economic duress, see Flores 
Barroeta, supra note 44. The Mexican Supreme Court decision credited with validating an ex-
press stipulation allowing for extrajudicial rescission is Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal, S.A., 
Suprema Corte de Justicia, (1955] 122-23 Semanario 538, holding reprinted in GUTIERREZ GON· 
ZALEZ, supra note 44, at 534; see Mexico Tractor and Machinery Co. S.A., Suprema Corte de 
Justicia, [1957]1 Semanario 119, holding reprinted in GUTIERREZ GONZALEZ, supra note 44, at 535; 
see also the pioneering article by Headrick, La Rescision de La Compraventa, REV. DE LA FAC. DE 
DERECHO DE LA V.N.A.M. Feb.-Mar. 1963, at 83,89 [hereinafter cited as Headrick]. 
46. Tribunal de Casacion, Sentencia de 4 de Agosta de 1945, reprinted in resolutive part in 
CASAFRONT ROMERO, supra note 45, at 44-45. 
47. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text. 
48. See Mexico Tractor, supra note 45, and comment thereto in Headrick, supra note 45, at 87, 
89. 
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property upon indications of the buyer's anticipatory breach "guilty of the 
crime of fraud. "49 Such a seller was not relieved of culpability by the assertion 
that the buyer had failed to perform his obligations in a draft agreement. The 
fact that the buyer did not comply with his obligations, in the court's words, 
"does not give the accused the right to treat the contract as rescinded. For he 
has the right to bring an appropriate action before the judicial 
authority .... "50 It was not until 1955 that the Supreme Court of Mexico 
clearly decided that a contractual stipulation setting forth the grounds for 
rescission was enforceable, but this was limited to contracts which contained 
"express" rescissory stipulations. 51 
IV. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES AND 
LA TIN AMERICAN (F 1) VERSIONS 
The examinations of the (F 1) prototype version in Jewish medieval responsa 
indicated that the standard was, by definition, restrictive or incompatible with 
a universal definition of "brotherhood." It also indicated that (F1) was inex-
tricably tied to trust. The standard was applied to those who could be trusted 
(brethren in the religious sense) and by applying it, i. e., by demanding 
brotherly conduct, trust was fostered. 
The (F 1) versions in United States law indicate that the standard is still ap-
plied in a restrictive fashion, but the brotherhood is no longer predicated on a 
religious, familial or tribal duty. In the U.S. it is predicated on the profes-
sional responsibility of trustees, parties with superior knowledge or contrac-
tual dominance toward weaker parties. It also applies, but not as strictly, to 
certain aspects of commercial transactions among merchants, e.g. , where their 
contractual losses are required to be minimized. As with medieval Jewish 
responsa law, United States law trusts certain parties to act in a brotherly 
fashion and insures such trust by imposing an accountability whose brotherly 
strictness increases with the degree of self-interest present in the transaction in 
question. 
The Latin American statutory and decisional law reflects an unwillingness 
to trust the trustee when acting in discretionary and especially self-interested 
transactions. This attitude results in economic harm to the beneficiary or ward 
when the trustee's self-interest is consistent with, or subordinated to, that of 
the beneficiary. A court will, in all likelihood, prevent the acquisition of a 
beneficiary's property by a trustee or a guardian even though this transaction 
could be proven considerably more beneficial to the beneficiary than any other 
49. Pedro]. Gonzalez, Suprema Corte de]usticia, [1964)80-11 Semanario 23, translated in W. 
L. Butte, Selected Mexican Cases 303 (Univ. of Texas, School of Law, Mimeo, 1970) 
[hereinafter cited as Butte). 
50. Id. 
51. See Banco National, supra note 45. 
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available in the open market. Similarly the statutory language, "nor enter in-
to any contract with respect of such property (beneficiary's) for himself, his 
ascendants, wife, children, "52 prevents an aquisition of a highly profitable 
business interest merely because the trustee or his family are partners, 
shareholders, or participants in such a business. 
In contrast with the Mexican legislative, judicial and doctrinal attitude, the 
German Civil Code enjoins the tutor from using the ward's estate for 
himself. 53 However, after listing the approved types of investments, the Ger-
man codifier vested authority to sanction investments other than those ex-
pressly listed in the guardianship courts, when special circumstances required 
such investments. 5~ Subsequent legislation made it clear that the court's ap-
proval could be denied only if the proposed investment, according to the cir-
cumstances of each case, was contrary to sound economic management. 55 
The comparison with German law in the area oflesion is also enlightening. 
Despite the fact that Article 138 of the German Civil Code was a model for the 
drafting of Mexican Code Article 17, its German interpretation contrasts 
sharply with that of Mexico. A classic study56 of pre-Second World War Ger-
man lesion decisions refers to one case in which a member of a wealthy family 
purchased goods at the defendant's store after the defendant was notified that 
the plaintiff was about to put the purchaser under guardianship as a spend-
thrift. The court held that the defendant's securing of the same prices from 
other customers was no bar to avoiding the transaction because of lesion, if ex-
pert testimony established that defendant's prices were excessive by the stand-
ards of "honest merchants. "57 Other decisions reflect the attitudes of German 
courts toward transactions involving needy purchasers. Typically, these deci-
sions involve the so-called" state of necessity, "58 and even though the German 
Reichsgericht in the state of necessity cases considered the entire economic situa-
tion of the needy party, it also held that "a merely temporary stringency, if 
sufficiently severe, might destroy the bargaining power of a person possessed 
of considerable financial resources". 59 Ignorance, or inexperience, was de-
fined, as early as 1905 by the Reichsgericht, as including that of "a simple 
workman who was so inexperienced that a purchase of fertilizer at excessive 
price was void. 60 Similarly, the attitude of German statutory and decisional 
52. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
53. I. FORRESTER, S.L. GOREN & H.M. ILGEN, GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 1805, at 279 (1975). 
54. /d., arts. 1807, 1808, 1811, at 279, 280. 
55. PALANDT, BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 1811, annot.(l)(b), at 1604 (1977). 
56. Dawson, supra note 44. 
57. /d. at 57 n.161, citing Judgment of April 18, 1905, Reichsgericht, [1905] Juristische 
Wochenschrift 366. 
58. Dawson, supra note 44, at 62. 
59. /d. 
60. Judgment of Jan. 7, 1905, (1905]60 Reichesgicht Zeitung 9, cited by Dawson note 44, at 63 
n.178. 
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law on mitigation of damages contrasts with Costa Rica's and Mexico's and is 
much closer to that which prevails in the United States. 61 
It would seem, therefore, that the presence or absence of (Fl) or the 
prevalence of any of its versions for given types of transactions is not the result 
of the representative jurisdiction's affiliation with what has been traditionally 
described as a civil or common law" legal system. " Instead, the application of 
(Fl) depends on the prevailing attitudes among legislators and judges with 
respect to who could be trusted to act as a brother in a commercial transaction. 
V. (F2) IN UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL LAW 
A. Introduction 
(F2) is the standard which requires that a party to a transaction treat the 
others in accordance with the manner in which most participants in that trans-
action and marketplace with a view to their own advantage treat each other. It 
is the standard that prevails in United States commercial law adjudication. It 
is used in contractual disputes, among other purposes, to determine the mean-
ing of contractual intent, the adequacy or sufficiency of reciprocal perfor-
mances and the availability of remedies and measure of recovery in the event 
of a breach of contract. It is used also in disputes involving "third" parties or 
parties other than those in "privity" or contractual relationship with each 
other, to determine who is entitled to immediate or permanent possession of 
disputed property. 
B. Contractual Disputes 
From ajudicial standpoint, contractual intent, the key conceptual device in 
U.S. contractual adjudication, is not necessarily synonymous with the plain 
meaning of the express terms of a contract if the contract was entered into by 
merchants or by regular participants in the market type transaction. In Colum-
bia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 62 for example, the contract explicitly stated a 
price per ton of phosphate, subject to an escalation clause dependent upon 
production costs. Appellant offered the testimony of witnesses whom the ap-
pellate court described as having "long experience in the trade"63 to argue 
61. 2 E.]. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 39 (London 1971) states: 
In a commercial sale, irrespective of what has been sold, the seller is entitled to deposit 
the goods in a warehouse or at another safe place at the buyer's risk or expense, or hav-
ing given the buyer warning, sell the goods or documents by public auction (Section 
383(3) BGB); ... No warning is required where the goods are perishable or where a 
warning would be impracticable (untunlich). Where there is a market price, the sale 
can be effected through an authorized broker. 
A comparison of Article 373 of the German Commercial Code of 1900, HANDELS GESETZBUCH 
art. 373 (Ger. 1900), with U .C.C. § 2-706 reveals a remarkably similar approach to seller's 
remedy of resale explained, perhaps, by Karl Llewellyn's exposure to German law. 
62. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). 
63. !d. at 7. 
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that because of uncertain crop and weather conditions, the stipulation of ex-
press price and quantity terms in contracts for materials in the mixed fertilizer 
market are "mere projections to be adjusted according to market forces. "64 
The district court held that the evidence should be excluded stating that 
"custom and usage or course of dealing are not admissible to contradict ex-
press, plain, unambiguous language of a valid written contract, which by vir-
tue of its detail negates the proposition that the contract is open to variances in 
its terms.' '65 The appellate court reversed, holding that, consistent with the 
legislative attitude apparent in the official comment to U.C.C. § 2-202, 
"course of dealing and usage of trade, unless carefully negated, are admissible 
to supplement the terms of any writing," and that "contracts are to be read on 
the assumption that these elements were taken for granted when the document 
was phrased. "66 
Granted that the Fourth Circuit's reading of the term "supplement" is 
broad enough to include not only an addition but also a negation of the ap-
parent or "plain" meaning of stipulations, the fact remains that this decision 
is representative of judicial attitudes in the United States. The trend in the 
United States, despite the parol evidence rule, is to establish the meaning of 
contractual intent not merely by resort to lay dictionaries or by searching for 
the "internal logic" of a contract, but by going outside the contract to 
establish what is "reasonable" under the circumstances. This is frequently 
just another term for what is niost commonly done by the parties or by most 
participants in the trade or marketplace. 67 Thus, even when a court attempts 
to define a term as susceptible to a plain or unambiguous meaning as 
"chicken" by resort to a dictionary, or to the contract's internal logic, it 
ultimately relies on a market consideration such as the following: 
It is scarcely an answer to say, as plaintiff does in its brief, that the 
33¢ price offered for the 2 Y2 -3 lb. chickens was closer to the prevail-
ing 35¢ price for broilers than to the 30¢ at which defendant pro-
64. /d. 
65. /d. at 8. 
66. /d. at 10-11. The court had established already that in accordance with the official com-
ment to 2-202 the section "rejected the old rule that evidence of course of dealing or usage of 
trade can be introduced only when the contract is ambiguous." /d. at 9. 
67. For the importance of course of dealing see Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 222 F. 
Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa, 1963) (where course of dealing was used by the court to modify the literal 
terms used by the parties). The market also supplies the meaning of missing terms of such 
significance as the price in U.C.C. adjudication. See, e.g., Llewellyn's Memorandum Replying to 
the Report of Task Group 1 ofthe Special Committee ofthe Commerce and Industry Association 
of New York Inc., on the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, 
1954 REPORT 106,117-18 (1954): 
You can be inaccurate about other things or leave them out. You refer to the market-
you have to keep the jury from going crazy. You can't swear too much ofa price onto a 
guy where there is a market around to test whether or not it is likely that that was the 
term agreed upon. 
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cured fowl. Plaintiff must have expected defendant to make some 
profit - certainly it could not have expected defendant deliberately 
to incur a 10ss.68 
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In other words, even when the question is as seemingly unambiguous as what 
the contractual meaning of "chicken" is, the intent of the parties is deter-
mined by asking what would a merchant, acting as a regular participant in a 
market transaction, viewing his own advantage, have meant by the term 
"chicken' '? 
Reasonableness in the sense of market-like behavior also governs the deter-
mination of whether a seller or a buyer can claim the specific performance of a 
contract as contrasted with the damages resulting from a resale to or repur-
chase from another contracting party, or from the rescission ofthe contract. 69 
It also governs questions on the appropriate time to secure the substitute 
performance or place at which to buy or sell the substituted goods. 70 
C. Third Party Rights 
The rights of parties, such as bona fide purchasers of property (including 
negotiable instruments or other types of commercial paper) as well as the 
rights of creditors who advance money on the security of the debtor's personal 
or real property, are predicated upon the giving of value. This is a concept 
which is deeply influenced by market considerations. Despite the U.C.C.'s 
definition of value as constituting generally "any consideration sufficient to 
support a simple contract,"71 the U.C.C. does not regard a "taking" of a 
negotiable instrument as "for value" unless the agreed consideration had 
been performed ... "72 Reflecting the same attitude, courts in the United 
States have held since the turn of the century that the negotiation of an instru-
ment in consideration of the giving of credit to the depositor of a check is not a 
giving for value within the meaning of negotiable instruments law. 73 An actual 
purchase from the depositor was required to qualify the bank as a holder for 
68. Frigaliment Importing Co., Ltd., v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 
120 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
69. See note 19 supra. 
70. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-706,2-712. 
71. See U.C.C. § 1-201(44). 
72. See U.C.C. § 3-303. 
73. See Citizens' State Bank v. Cowles, 180 N.Y. 346, 73 N.E. 33 (1905) construing inter alia, 
Sections 52(3), 191(12) and 25 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law on the meaning of 
value and holding: 
if the evidence would support the inference that the plaintiff did not buy the check, but 
simply gave Hoffman credit for the amount upon its books, then the plaintiff is not a 
holder in due course, within the law merchant, as that term is now defined in the 
Negotiable Instruments Law .... 
180 N.Y. at 348-49,73 N.E. at 33. For similar holdings see cases cited by W.E. BRIITON, CASES 
OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 216 n.7 (1961). 
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value. H The rights of the third party, known as a holder for value of a 
negotiable instrument, are measured then not merely by his having suffered 
an ascertainable detriment, but by his having given something which to most 
participants in the acquisition of commercial paper is valuable. 
Similarly, despite the supposed applicability of the "simple contract" con-
sideration concept of value to Article 9 secured transactions,75 the type of 
value which warrants priority in Article 9 is not antecedent value but "new 
value. " Although not expressly defined, this concept likewise bears a market 
imprint. For example, a purchase money security interest, one of the code's 
favorite security interests, is created 
to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the col-
lateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who 
by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable 
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is 
in fact so used. 76 
Consequently, the value that makes it possible for the buyer to purchase on 
credit will be preferred over a less instrumental (from a market standpoint) ad-
vance or obligation. Priorities will be arranged according to a principle of 
specificity: The more specific the contribution to the marketable value of the 
"collateral" in question, the higher its priority.77 It must be noted that in 
ascribing a preeminent role in these disputes involving secured creditors and 
74. !d. 
75. Set V.C.C. § 9-108. 
76. V.C.C. § 9-107; see V.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4), and Comments 3,4; 2 G. GILMORE, SECUR-
ITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 782 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE];]. WHITE & R. 
SUMMERS. VNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 914-16 (1972). 
77. See V.C.C. § 9-312, Comments 2,3. For an extension of the "enabling" rationale present 
in the protection of a purchase money security interest creditor to the conflict between a judge-
ment lienor whose lien predates a "future advance" by a secured creditor who relies on the same 
collateral as is affected by the lien see GILMORE, supra note 76, at 939: 
to what extent is the lienor harmed by being subordinated to legitimate future advances 
(obligatory or voluntary) made under an existing loan agreement? We have hypothe-
sized successive loans on April I and May I with a lien attaching on April 15. If the 
lienor has the machinery sold, he will succeed in reaching the debtor's equity in the 
machinery (its value less the April I loan if we have no other interest to worry about). If 
he delays the sale until after May I, he will still reach the debtor's equity, but that will 
now have been diminished by the May I loan. However, the debtor's assets have not 
been depleted: the May I advance balances the diminution of his equity in the 
machinery. The lienor will now receive less from the sale of the machinery than he 
would have received before May I, but his chance of collecting his claim from the debt-
or's remaining assets (which now include the May I advance) is as good as ever; 
presumably it is better than ever since the debtor now has a new supply of working 
capital. 
The preceding passage by one of the most qualified analysts of Anglo-American secured transac-
tions law clearly reveals the policy of balancing both the contribution to marketable value of the 
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purchasers of personal property to the giving of value, United States common 
and statutory law deemphasized the role of title as the decisive finding. 78 What 
used to be decided in the nineteenth century on the basis of who was the 
"rightful" owner, who had "retained ownership" or who has acquired title 
from the owner is seldom decided on such a basis presently. The giving of the 
most specific value coupled with the giving of actual or constructive notice to 
the third parties, who are likely to give value, are now the key determinants in 
U.S. law. 79 
VI. (F2) IN LATIN AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW 
A. Introduction 
(F2) is used in Latin American commercial adjudication and is apparent in 
some Argentine and Costa Rican decisions,80 but its application is neither as 
widespread nor as determinative of the outcome of the controversy as it is in 
United States common law, especially if it is at odds with the intent expressed 
in formal deeds or documents. The overwhelming evidentiary weight of 
Public Deeds (Escrituras Publicas) in Latin American procedural law , and the 
widespread use of these deeds in significant commercial transactions (which 
are the ones most likely to be litigated) contributes to the restricted role of 
parol evidence, course of dealing and of usage of trade. The attitude of Latin 
American courts toward contractual obligations will be illustrated by reference 
to Mexican, Argentine and Chilean decisions. 
coliateral (where the secured creditor is concerned) and the preservation of attachable assets 
where an unsecured judgment lienor is concerned. 
78. Se. V.C.C. ~ y-~U~, and Comment th~reto; V.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3. 
79. Set notably V.C.C. §§ 9-312,9-313. 
80. In Argentine law s •• , t.g., Banco Polaco Polska Kasa Opieki v. Van der Velde y Wrange, 
(1942] 2 Jurisprudencia Argentina U.A.] 242, 248 as crucial a banking and negotiable in-
struments law question, whether in the absense of an express stipulation the negotiation of a draft 
drawn by a beneficiary of a letter of credit on a bank that advises the letter of credit is with or 
without recourse on the beneficiary was resolved by establishing the custom of the majority of 
Buenos Aires banks. It should be noted, however, that the courts' reliance on custom was in large 
measure prompted by Article 738 of the commercial code in force, which expressly directed 
courts to the "commercial usages" when the question involved essential requirements of the bill 
of exchange or its presentation, acceptance, payment, protest and notification. And even though 
the matter was not of an essential formal requirement the legislative intention on an area related 
to the problem at hand was quite clear. In Costa Rican law, see Halabi Mirage v. Pacific 
Refrigeration, Sala de Casacion, 22 de diciembre 1958, reprinted in 2 KOZOLCHYK & TORREALBA, 
supra note 23, at 108, (where the question whether a stated price per dozen of merchandise was 
the product of a typographical mistake was resolved by establishing, inter alia, the current price 
among comparable traders). As stated by this author elsewhere, the applicability of custom or 
usage in Latin American law depends in large measure on the legislative authorization (usually 
expressed in the civil or commercial codes) of the applicability of customary law. B. KOZOLCHYK, 
COMMERCIAL LEITERS OF CREDITS IN THE AMERICAS 47 (1966). 
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B. Mexican Contract Law Adjudication 
1. Simulation, Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade 
Simulation is the statement of an intent in a deed or document only for of-
ficial purposes, masking the true, secret or unexpressed intent of the parties. 
Simulation is not an uncommon occurrence in Mexican commercial practice, 
especially when the transaction bears a significant tax,81 as does for example, 
the sale or encumbrance of real property. In these transactions, the price of the 
conveyed land is frequently lowered in the public deed or official legal docu-
ment, or the transaction itself is disguised in a manner calculated to avoid or 
reduce considerably the tax due. Such practices involve the danger of one of 
the participants attempting to take advantage of the stated or ostensible intent 
at the other's expense, particularly when courts read the deeds or documents 
in a strict or literal fashion. This danger is illustrated in the 1958 Fernando 
Lopez decision by the Supreme Court of Mexico. 82 
The plaintiff agreed to sell iand to the defendant using a private document 
which stated that the price of the land was 100 pesos. Despite the fact that 
market price of the land was appraised by an expert witness to be 8,000 pesos, 
defendant insisted on paying only the stated price. Plaintiff offered evidence to 
prove that the stated price was inserted merely to accommodate defendant's 
attempt to avoid payment of real estate transfer taxes. In his answer, the 
defendant pointed to language in the deed which states that the parties agreed 
that the stated price was fair and lawful, and that even if in the opinion of ex-
perts the price was found to be higher than stated, it was the parties' intention 
to mutually donate whatever excess or difference existed between market and 
contract. 83 The lower court judge in the state of Puebla held that plaintiff had 
failed to prove his action on nullity of the deed of sale when attempting to in-
troduce parol evidence on the falsity of the intent. 84 Plaintiff appealed to the 
appellate court in Puebla which confirmed the lower court's decision. On ap-
peal, the Mexican Supreme Court ordered that evidence on the possibile nul-
lity of the agreement be considered by the state appellate court. 85 In com-
81. For a description of simulation in Latin American commercial practices, see Kozolchyk, 
Law and the Credit Structure in Latin America 7 VA. J. INT'L L. I, 11, 12, 33-35 (1967). 
82. Fernando Lopez, [1958] 14- Semanario 81, translated in Butte, supra note 49, at 355-65. 
83. Butte, supra note 49, at 357. The Mexican practice of waiving any claim of lesion by a for-
mal recital in the deed has roots in medieval practices, equally intent on simulation but directed 
mainly against the church's usury prohibition. Dawson, supra note 44, at 374-75, reports that: 
Contracting parties attempted to evade the effect of rules as to laesio by formal clauses of 
renunciation, by the use of the oath and by recitals that any discrepancy between the 
values exchanged represented an outright gift. These attempts encountered vigorous 
resistance from legal writers and courts with the effect that they were rendered largely 
ineffective. 
See also CODE CIVIL art. 1674 (Fr. 1804). 
84. Butte, supra note 49, at 357-58. 
85. [d. 
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pliance with this decision the state appellate court rendered a new decision in 
which it found no reason to reverse the lower court's decision. It held that the 
parol evidence submitted by plaintiff s witnesses to the effect that the value of 
the land was 8,000 pesos showed at best what the property was worth in the 
market and not what the parties had agreed upon as the price of the sale. 86 The 
Supreme Court of Mexico found that "it having also been proved that the 
land which was sold is worth 8,000 pesos, it would be a juridical inequity to 
validate the simulated price of 100 pesos. This price was found to be null 
because there was not true consent on it.' '87 Furthermore, it found that the 
agreed upon or true price was 4,500 pesos. Nevertheless, because the price of 
the land was high enough to require the execution of a public deed and since 
such a deed was not executed, the court felt that it was unable to implement 
such an intent and instead decreed the transaction a nullity. 88 In support of its 
reasoning the Supreme Court quoted a passage in a textbook written by one of 
the justices which advocates the rule that once 
"the secret act" has been uncovered by a third party or by one of the 
contracting parties the "ostensible" act is left without legal effect. It 
also empowers any of the parties to uncover the secret act whenever 
"the other party tries to take advantage of the ostensible act". 89 
Unanswered by this passage is the problem raised by a party taking advantage 
of the simulation, i. e. , uncovering it once it is found to be unprofitable to con-
tinue to perform the contract in accordance with the "secret," "true" or 
"marketable" intent. 
But even when the Mexican courts attempt to effectuate the "true" or 
"marketable" intent, they are faced with the problem of what to do with the 
ostensibly valid document. Should this document be invalidated totally or par-
tially? If so, should it be on the basis of the testimony by parties or by 
witnesses brought by parties whose word the courts distrust in part, at least, as 
a result of the simulated behavior?90 This problem is brought to light in the 
86. /d. at 359. 
87. /d. at 361. 
88. /d. at 363. 
89. /d. at 365. 
90. Mexican procedural law textbooks invariably start the discussion on testimonial evidence 
by pointing out that: 
From Roman law times, the principle prevails that no one can be a witness in his own 
case (nemo debet esse testis in propria causa). The reason is that if the party testifies he can 
only do it in his own favor or against his own interest. In the former case it would be 
confessing to the other party's claim, in the latter case the testimony would be redun-
dant and useless. 
J. BECERRA BAUTISTA, EL PROCESOCIVIL EN MEXICO III, at 112 (Porrua 4th ed. 1974); seta/so E. 
PALLARES. DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 372, 373 (Porrua 5th ed. 1974) (where he takes issue with 
the suggestion by F. Carnelutti, an Italian authority, that the confession by a party should be 
regarded as a form of testimony). These Mexican attitudes toward the weight and credibility of 
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1954 Supreme Court decision, Gonzalez Varela Bernardo. 91 The parties executed 
a private document in which defendant-buyer appeared to have paid plaintiff-
seller 50,000 pesos of the purchase price of land and agreed to pay an addi-
tional 36,000 pesos. In addition, the parties executed a public deed in which 
defendant acknowledged receipt of 36,000 pesos from plaintiff and agreed to 
execute a mortgage for this amount using as security land said to have been ac-
quired from plaintiff. In response to plaintiffs plea for a decree of specific per-
formance ordering the execution of the mortgage, an intermediate appellate 
court stated: 
Defendants offered as evidence in their behalf the testimony of the 
witness A.G .... who testified that G.V. had said, and the witness 
heard, that the 36,000 pesos to which the mortgage deed refers were 
the same ones which the defendant still owed to the plaintiff, as a 
result of the purchase of the lots .... This oral testimony, in spite of 
the fact that it was made by only one witness lead this court to the 
conviction that in fact, the 36,000 pesos that the plaintiff now claims 
from the defendants, were not given to them in cash, but, in order to 
guarantee payment of the 36,000 pesos, which they still owed the 
plaintiff as a result of the purchase and sale transaction . . . the 
plaintiff required a mortgage from them, and for this purpose the 
parties simulated a loan with interest and mortgage guarantee. The 
function of the courts is not to give effect to simulated acts, even 
though they may fulfill certain requirements of a formal character; 
on the contrary, ... it is to bring light to the facts and impart 
justice. It would be from every point of view unjust for this court to 
order JPA and MIG to pay 36,000 pesos on the supposed loan agree-
ment with interest and accompanying mortgage, because if this were 
ordered, there would still be outstanding the right of the said G. V. to 
require JP A and his wife to pay another 36,000 pesos. That is to say 
those which the defendants say was still owing to G.V. as a result of 
the sale .... 92 
parties' testimony are shared widely throughout Latin America. Typically, Argentine courts 
have held: "The statements of parties answering interrogatories are not evidence in their favor 
... they are a simple reaffirmation of their pleadings. They neither change the terms of the litis, 
nor do they afford these terms any greater credibility." Iriberry v. Lasalle, Camara 1 era Ap. Mar 
del Plata, 16 de julio de 1964, [1965)117 La Ley 821, involving a simulated sale transaction. See 
also, on how an allegation or statement of fact by a party cannot benefit but can harm the party's 
position, Varsky v. Flomenbaum, Camara Nacional Civil Sala E., 3 de octubre de 1966, [1967) 
125 La Ley 585, also involving an allegedly simulated transaction. But if. 1 D. ECHANDIA. 
TEORIA GENERAL DE LA PRUEBAJUDICIAL 23 et seq. (Argen. 1974) advocating, as does Carnelutti, 
that greater weight be given to parties' testimony. Noteworthy (although neither articulated nor 
warranted) assumptions by the traditionalists are: 1) that parties necessarily will testify to that 
which is in their interest; 2) that such testimony is bound to be inconsistent inter se and with the 
truth and; 3) that it will be no value in establishing facts even where the parties' interest is not in 
conflict. 
91. Gonzales Varela Bernado, [1955) 125-II Semanario 1573, translated in Butte, supra note 49, 
at 341-45. 
92. Butte, supra note 49, at 343. 
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Significantly, the intermediate appellate court assumed that although plain-
tiff had not yet claimed any more than the parties had truly agreed to, there 
was a serious likelihood that if such an intention was implemented, the plain-
tiff would unjustly enrich himself in the future by claiming the same sum using 
the private document as evidence. 95 However, by adopting this attitude, the 
court was depriving the plaintiff of the agreed upon and marketplace value. 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision but in doing so its reasoning was, 
paradoxically, based upon strict law considerations: 
The hearsay testimony of one witness can be given no significant 
weight in this case .... The court below gives extraordinary weight 
to this evidence in disregard of the old principle "Unus testis, nul/us 
testis", and as the other considerations by the court below are sup-
ported only by suppositions [it] is evident that its reasoning is inade-
quate. . . . It should be observed moreover that (the lower court 
reasoning) in no way corresponds to the need to decide civil con-
troversies such as this amparo in accordance with strict law.' '94 
The court added that: 
It is pertinent to observe of course, that there is no legal nor material 
incompatibility between the one and the other transaction (the sale 
and the loan) and since the defendants are both competent to con-
tract and as from the deed itself it appears that at the moment of 
making the agreement they were in full command of their mental 
faculties and executed the contract with their free consent .... It is 
neither logical nor legal that on the basis of such fragile presump-
tions they should attempt now to deny the validity and efficacy of the 
obligations undertaken by them, especially if these obligations were 
stipulated in solemn form under the certificate of the notary public 
and with all the requisites provided by law. 9S 
The strong reluctance to examine contractual intent in the light of market con-
siderations is apparent also with regard to course of dealing. In a case involv-
ing the question of whether, in the absence of a contractual stipulation on the 
place of payment and default, plaintiff was entitled to rely on the fact that 
defendant's preceding 43 installment payments were made at plaintiffs 
domicile,96 the Supreme Court of Mexico stated: 
Although it is true that the purchaser admitted that he had the 
obligation to make payments at the vendor's house, and that it was 
there that he delivered the 43 payments which he made, ... it is 
also true that his admission and his past conduct do not have the 
93. [d. 
94-. [d. 
95. /d. at 34040. 
96. Ana Maria Navarrete Carapia, [1964-)85 Semanario 30, translated in Butte, supra note 4-9, 
at 313, 317. 
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evidentiary force that the plaintiff wishes to attribute to them. The 
admission cannot be upheld because it is contradicted by the terms 
of the contract where nothing is said or promised with respect to the 
admission. The only conclusion to be drawn from such an admission 
then is that the party making it erroneously believed that he had to 
take the payments to his creditor, and not that the creditor had to 
come to him to collect them. 97 
The weight attributed to contractual silence by the Supreme Court of Mexico 
is especially noteworthy. Even though silent on the place the parties wished to 
designate as the place of payment and default, contractual silence was deemed 
to negate the parties' reiterated conduct. 
2. Equity 
Predictably, the Mexican courts' unwillingness to allow contractual intent 
to be determined by course of dealing and usage of trade is linked with a reluc-
tance to adjudicate contractual disputes in accordance with what United States 
courts usually describe as equitable principles. Two Mexican Supreme Court 
decisions illustrate this point. 
In the 1941 decision of Suc. de ViteriJorge98 it appeared that Mr. Viteri, an 
engineer, entered into an agreement with the owner of an oil well, in which 
Mr. Viteri undertook to make an unproductive well productive. In addition, 
Mr. Viteri agreed to manage and supervise production once the well was 
made productive and for as long as it continued to be profitable. In exchange 
for such an obligation Mr. Viteri was to receive fifty percent of the profits 
yielded by his efforts. The lower court found that Mr. Viteri's efforts had been 
successful, and that for a period of time prior to his death Mr. Viteri managed 
the well operations. Upon his death, his estate claimed the right to continue to 
receive fifty percent of the well profits. The Supreme Court as well as the 
lower courts refused to allow his claim. The courts' reasoning is particularly 
revealing. 
The lower courts based their decisions on the characterization of the con-
tract as an agreement to enter into a joint venture (asociacion en participacion) as 
opposed to a contract for the performance of service on a lump sum payment 
basis. 99 The intermediate appellate court acknowledged the harshness of 
depriving the plaintiffs estate of the fifty percent profit upon Viteri's death, 
especially since the evidence of plaintiffs contribution to the profitability of 
the well stood unchallenged. Nevertheless, since the agreement constituted a 
joint venture association, and this association was not dissolved in accordance 
97. Butte, supra note 49, at 316. 
98. Sue. de. Viteri Jorge, [1955] 125 Semanario 315, translated in Butte, supra note 49, at 
309-12. 
99. /d. at 309-10. 
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with dissolution requirements of the law of business associations, the court 
stated that it was powerless to adjudicate the claim to the share as requested by 
Viteri's estate. IOO The Supreme Court characterized Viteri's obligations as 
"personal" in nature and thus the right to fifty percent of the profits was 
limited to the production of oil for as long a time as Viteri, by his personal 
work, made profitability possible. lol Upon his death, the Supreme Court 
reasoned, the other party to the contract could terminate the agreement and 
cancel its obligations thereunder. 102 In response to appellant's contention that 
Viteri's work could not be categorized really as "personal" as it could have 
been done by another person having Viteri's skills, the Supreme Court stated: 
"The important consideration is not that the technical work can be replaced 
but that, since the work agreed upon is strictly personal, if he can no longer 
perform it, the other party has the right to rescind the contract. "103 The estate 
was deprived of the right to fifty percent of the profits. 
In response to appellant's claim that defendants would be unjustifiably 
enriched by the lower court's holding, the Supreme Court admitted the 
possibility that Viteri's bringing the well into production was of great 
economic significance. The Court also stated that, in comparison with the 
subsequent work of management, supervision and maintenance, each of these 
activities might deserve a twenty-five percent share of the surplus oil produc-
tion. Yet, because the appellants did not apportion the value of the claims, the 
Supreme Court said it was powerless to apportion them on their behalf. 10. Ac-
cordingly the appeal was denied and with it the claim to Mr. Viteri's fifty per-
cent of the profits. 
The Supreme Court's reliance on the characterization of the contract as 
"strictly personal" is not without serious conceptual difficulties. Aside from 
the fact pointed out by the appellant, that a substitute performance was indeed 
possible, the court assumed that the rights earned by a strictly personal per-
formance were neither assignable nor inheritable. This assumption ignored 
the distinction between the right to perform in a "strictly personal" contract 
and the rights earned after complete or significant part performance of a con-
tract. The absurdity of such a reasoning is highlighted by the hypothetical 
situation in which Mr. Viteri had been paid part of his share of production just 
after completing the work of making the well profitable. Would his estate not 
have been entitled to such a share? Ifhis estate could have inherited proceeds, 
why could it not inherit rights to proceeds earned by performance? The 
Supreme Court of Mexico chose to rely on the classification of an obligation as 
100. Id. at 310. 
101. Id. at 311. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 312. 
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"strictly personal" and its asserted sequel of untransferability (however in-
consistent the application of such a definition was in the different contexts of a 
right to perform and a right to inherit proceeds earned by performance) rather 
than on the benefits unjustly appropriated by the defendants. This attitude is 
consistent with that shown in other decisions where equity would have re-
quired that contracts be adjudicated by evaluating the mutuality of the parties' 
.bargain in light of the market value of the respective performances, but the 
Court chose the literal tenor of contractual stipulations. 
In the 1932 Mexican Supreme Court decision Ka"as v. Friedemberg S.A., 105 
plaintiff, as an endorsee, holder in due course of three bills of exchange ac-
cepted (but unpaid) by defendant, claimed payment of 1357 U.S. dollars or its 
equivalent in Mexican pesos. The lower court judge ordered payment of 3,420 
Mexican pesos and, when payment was refused, decreed execution of judg-
ment against defendant's property.l06 Both parties appealed the execution 
decree. Plaintiff asserted that the amount of Mexican pesos set forth in the 
decree corresponded, not to the rate of exchange at the time of the decreed 
payment by the court, but to the rate in effect at the time of the filing of the 
complaint. There was a significant difference between these two amounts as a 
result of monetary devaluation. He contended that the lower court's decision 
was contrary both to Mexico's monetary law and to the principles of equity. 
Article 509 of the Mexican Commercial Code in force at that time provided 
that if the foreign currency stipulated in the bill of exchange was not legal 
tender, the payment would be in a sum equivalent to that stipulated on the 
basis of the rate of exchange in effect on the instrument's "due date" (dia del 
vencimiento).107 However, Article 8 of the subsequently enacted monetary law 
provided that the rate of exchange for the determination of the amount due 
was that in effect on the date of payment (pago).108 The Supreme Court chose 
to read the term payment as if it meant the due date of the bill of exchange and 
not the date of actual payment. 109 Assertedly, this interpretation avoided any 
possible conflict between the above mentioned provisions. In reply to 
plaintiffs contention that defendant was unjustly enriched by such an inter-
pretation, the court stated that" the rise or fall of rates of exchange and their 
effects upon payment is an economic phenomenon which is independent of the 
legal necessity to fix, as of the initiation of lawsuits, the quantum of the 
claim. "110 In addition, the court addressed itself to the role of equitable prin-
ciples in its adjudication as follows: 
105. Gerhard Karras y Cia v. Friedemberg S.A., [1934] 5 Revista General de Derecho y 
J urisprudencia 116. 
106. !d. at 117. 
107. Id. at 119. 
108. !d. 
109. !d. 
110. !d. at 120. 
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The appellant invokes equity in order to obtain a higher recovery, 
without taking into account that a court oflaw as this court is, except 
in those cases where the law authorizes resort to equitable principles 
to resolve concrete cases, cannot apply such principles because it 
would violate equality before the law which is the basis of social 
order. As long as there are legal provisions applicable to the case in 
question there is no reason to attempt to correct them, thereby 
substituting the legislative by another, entirely subjective 
will .... 111 
245 
In his insightful commentary on this decision, Professor Garcia Maynez 
pointed out that statutory law in force at the time this decision was rendered 
directed the courts to decide controversies involving equal rights or rights of 
the same legal species by "observing the greatest possible equality between the 
parties," or on the basis of" the maximum amount of reciprocity. "112 Accord-
ingly, even though equity could not in Professor Garcia Maynez' opinion cor-
rect statutory law, it definitely had a supplementary role, especially where 
statutory law was unclear .113 
But there is more to this decision than a mistaken assumption of the sup-
plementary role of equity, or an excessively formalistic view of pleading (a 
view that would rather countenance unjust enrichment than allow an 
amended complaint reflecting the larger sum claimed). The court perceived 
the market value of the performances involved as ' , an economic 
phenomenon" which was "independent" oflegal consideration.u+ Thus, law 
was perceived as concerned with facts devoid of economic or marketplace im-
plications. Contrary to conventional wisdom,1I5 equity, in turn, was perceived 
as bringing about inequality before the law, because equitable decision-
making was assumed to be perforce, highly subjective or arbitrary. 
111. [d. 
112. /d. at 127. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. at 120; see text accompanying note 110 supra. 
115. The conventional wisdom referred to in the principal text is that expressed by Aristotle in 
Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by 
the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by 
over simplicity, to correct the omission to say what the legislator himself would have 
said had he been present, and would have put into his law ifhe had known. And this is 
the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its univer-
sality. 
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, translated in 11 THE OXFORD TRANSLATION OF ARIS-
TOTLE (W. D. Ross. ed. 1925), reprinted in G. CHRISTIE,JURISPRUDENCE, TEXT AND READINGS 
70-71 (1973). The Mexican Supreme Court's version of equality therefore is predicated on the 
assumption that all statements by the law are not only universal (to use Aristotle's term) but also 
invariably, all encompassing in nature. For only such all encompassing statutes (i.e., those who 
treat equals as equals and unequals and unequals) could validly claim equality 'of treatment. 
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C. Equity in Contractual Adjudications of other Latin American Countries 
The previously described attitude is not peculiar to Mexico's Supreme 
Court. A 1971 study of Chilean decisions by Professor Gesche Miiller on the 
effect of monetary devaluation on contractual obligations concludes that: 
despite the acute monetary devaluation of almost half a century, 
Chilean case law and doctrine has inflexibily applied the 
nominalistic doctrine .... This has lead to a distortion of the con-
cept of equity in the Civil Code, in areas such as ... payment of 
dividends by civil and commercial companies, restitution, rescission 
or nullity of contracts, specific performance of promises in bilateral 
contracts where one party promised money and the other iden-
tifiable goods or property, installment payments over a long period 
of time, etc. 116 
Similarly, Professor Rosenn's recent study on inflation in Latin American 
law points out that 
Unlike American, Austrian, French, German and Polish 
legislatures, which enacted general legislation revalorizing specific 
categories of obligations expressed in badly depreciated currency, 
Latin American legislatures have mandated revalorization only in a 
very limited number of circumstances. Such exceptional legislation 
generally has been aimed at protecting the government's own 
patrimony or the smooth operation of government services rather 
than bailing out improvident contractors. 117 
In addition, Rosenn points out that despite the legislative enactment in Argen-
tina of the "imprevision"118 doctrine as a ground for annulling or revising a 
116. B. GESCHE MULLER. JURISPRUDENCIA DINAMICA Y LA DESVALORIZACION MONETARIA Y 
OTROS PROBLEMAS DEL DERECHO 18 (Chile 1971) [hereinafter cited as GESCHE MULLER). 
117. Rosenn, The Effects oj biflation on the Law oj Obligations in Latin America, 2 B.C. INT'L & 
COMPo L. REV. 269, 278 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rosenn). 
118. Professor Rosenn, id., traces the origins of the imprevision doctrine to the medieval doc-
trine of rebus sic stantibus, which: 
posits that every contract contains a tacit clause (or implicit conditions subsequent) end-
ing or modifying its obligatory force whenever there has been such a substantial change 
in the state of facts prevailing at the date of the contract was made as to render its per-
formance unjust .... 
There is no single definition of the theory of imprevision, but its core concept is that a 
court may annul or revise a contract whenever there has been a substantial and unfore-
seen change in the economic conditions prevailing at the time the contract was made, 
rendering performance by the obligor exceedingly onerous, though not objectively im-
possible. 
Id. at 279,280 (citation omitted). A 1968 amendment of Article 1198 of the Argentine Civil Code 
provided that: "If in contracts with deferred or continued performance, the performance of one 
of the parties becomes excessively onerous because of extraordinary and unforeseeable events, the 
prejudiced party may demand the termination of the contract .... " C6D1GO CIVIL art. 1198 
(Argen.). On this amendment see Rosenn, supra note 117, at 281. 
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contract whenever there is an unforeseen substantial change in the economic 
conditions prevailing at the time of entering into the agreement, Argentine 
courts until quite recently have been reluctant to relieve contractual parties. 
They have asserted that inflation is too notorious a fact of life in Argentina to 
be ignored by the parties. 119 
As with the Mexican Supreme Court's use of strict pleading to disqualify 
the claim to an amount of pesos equivalent to the dollars specified in the text of 
a bill of exchange, Argentina's National Appellate Commercial Court refused 
as late as December 1977, to revalue claims embodied in negotiable in-
struments because this would have required that the courts disregard the "in-
dependent" nature ofthe promise in the negotiable instrument and "delve in-
to underlying contractual considerations .... "120 Formalism and strict 
pleading were equally apparent in the Chilean Supreme Court's refusal to 
revalue damages and death benefits awards by courts of first instance by as-
serting that such a revaluation would have inflicted serious harm on the princi-
ple of res judicata. 121 
The reluctance of Argentina and Chilean courts to adopt a "valoristic" or 
equivalent value approach to the discharge of monetary obligations cannot be 
attributed solely or even preponderantly to the legislative adoption of a 
nominalistic principle of adjudication. Court decisions in these countries, un-
til recently, have provided every indication that the nominalistic approach is 
so highly compatible with the judicial sense of fairness that it is applied even 
where the facts involved do not require or warrant its application. For exam-
ple, in Bustillo v. Cafe Paulista S.R.L., 122 a 1953 decision by the Supreme Court 
of Argentina, the issue was not orie of monetary equivalence but whether the 
parties to a long term lease could have validly agreed that in the event of a 
forty percent devaluation of Argentina's currency the amount due would be 
determined by an agreed upon arbitration procedure. In rejecting the validity 
of such a clause the Supreme Court equated the parties' stipulation to an usur-
pation of a public law function. This was presumably the State's power to im-
pose a nominal value regardless of the parties' choice of a market value. 123 It 
held that the determination in question was strictly legal in nature and 
119. See id. at 282 and also note this author's finding that "Spurred by the hyperinflation' of 
1975 and 1976 and a strong doctrinal current, the Argentine courts have recently jetisoned 
nominalism on their own and permitted recovery for monetary depreciation where there has been 
delay in payment of pecuniary obligations." /d. at 295 (citations omitted). 
120. judgment of April 13, 1977, Camara Nacional de 10 Commercial, en pleno, [1977J 42 La 
Ley 1, 2 '5. 
121. See Berta Guzman de Shirazawa v. Empresa de Ferrocarriles del Estado, 10 de·septiem-
bre de 1942, [1963]60 Revista de Derecho, jurisprudencia y Ciencias SociaJes y Gaceta de los 
Tribunales 407, extreu;ted and reprinted in GESCHE MULLER, supra note 116, at 57-69. 
'122. [1953] IIIjURISPRUDENCIAARGENTINA 89. 
123. /d. at 93·94. 
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therefore not within the competence of arbitrators who only should concern 
themselves with non-legal or "technical" matters. 124 On its face, this reason-
ing would seem contrary to that of Mexico's Supreme Court in the Karras deci-
sion where it was held that monetary devaluation was an economic fact with 
which the law was unconcerned. 125 At root, however, the contradiction is only 
apparent since both courts are equally jealous of their prerogative to decide 
what each perceives as a legal issue in the same nominalistic fashion. Both 
courts reject' 'non-legal" or market inspired considerations whether under the 
guise of economics, arbitration, or equity. 
D. Third Party Rights in Latin America 
In contrast with Anglo-American principles of adjudication which predicate 
in large measure the rights of third parties such as holders of negotiable in-
struments, purchasers of personal or real property and secured creditors on 
the giving of value and on the purpose of such a giving, value does not playa 
major role in the adjudication of some of the most economically significant 
third party rights in Latin American law. A 1964 decision by the Supreme 
Court of Colombia is particularly illustrative because the statutory law in force 
at that time in Colombia was a Spanish translation of the United States 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,126 a law in which value played a key 
role in determining the rights of holders in due course. 127 In Cia Bogotana de 
Teatros S.A., v. Ramirez,128 appellant alleged, inter alia, that defendant appellee 
was not a holder in due course (tenedor en debidaforma) of appellant's check 
because he had admitted in answers to interrogatories that he had not paid 
value for the checks in his possession. 129 It also appeared in the record that the 
checks' payees had denied having endorsed them to appellee.130 Appellant 
alleged that the lower court erred in dismissing his complaint by asserting that 
not all the elements of an unjust enrichment action had been listed and that 
even if all the elements of an unjust enrichment action had not been listed, his 
actions should have been treated as an action on restitution for monies 
wrongly paid or collected. 131 
After establishing that the action for restitution of monies wrongly paid or 
collected was a species of the unjust enrichment genus and that it would fail if 
124. Id. at 89 , 5. 
125. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
126. Ley de Instrumentos Negociables, 46 de 1923 (Colom.); see comment on its translation 
from the negotiable instruments law and adoption in E. JARAMILLO ScHLOSS, Los INSTRUMEN. 
TOS NEGOCIBLES EN EL NUEVO C6DIGO DE COMERCIO 66, 67 (Bogota 1974); R. RENGIFO, LA 
LETRA DE CAMBIO y EL CHEQUE 133·35 (Colombia 1977). 
127. See note 73 supra. 
128. Suprema Corte, (1964)107 GacetaJudicial 58. 
129. [d. at 62. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. 
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all the generic elements were not present,132 the Colombian court concluded 
that the negotiable instruments law in force presumed the genuineness of 
signatures and endorsements. 133 Accordingly, an allegation of falsity of an en-
dorsement required proof of the actual forgery. Moreover, the law was said to 
presume that when the instrument was in the hands of a holder in due course it 
had been validly transferred by his predecessors. In passing, it referred to the 
negotiable instruments law section on holding in due course and to the section 
which establishes the rebuttable presumption that a holding, unless proven 
otherwise, is in due course. Based on these sections, the court held that when 
the 10wer court required proof of the actual forgery (as contrasted with the en-
doriser's denial of the genuineness of their endorsement), it acted consistently 
with the law's policy to protect holders in due course. 134 It further agreed with 
the lower court's finding as to the impropriety of an unjust enrichment claim 
and rejected the appeal. Conspicuously absent was a discussion of the effect 
that appellee's failure to provide value had on his asserted status of holder in 
due course. 135 
Of equal economic significance to the determination of the status of a holder 
in due course in terms consistent with market practices, is the determination of 
who is entitled to the status of a protected third party purchaser of personal or 
real property, or of a secured creditor. In the field of personal property trans-
actions, market practices have made it clear that the same goods must be used 
as security or "collateral" by different parties simultaneously, albeit 
legitimately, in order to finance various stages of the transaction and of the 
distribution of goods process. When the same goods serve as security for the 
seller and his financiers, the buyer and his financiers, and when possession of 
the goods is with a third party such as a carrier or warehouseman during cer-
tain stages of the transaction and during another stage with the ultimate con-
sumer, the relevant market question is not who is the ultimate owner among 
the various legitimate claimants, but who among them has the worthiest claim 
to immediate possession. For whatever rights the first owner had prior to the 
goods' ingress into the channels of trade, the financing -of each subsequent 
participant in market transactions has required the fragmentation of such a 
right. Some rights are retained by the seller or his financier; some are incor-
porated into the document acknowledging receipt for transportation or 
warehousing; some are acquired by the merchant who buys the goods in order 
to resell them; some are acquired by his financier; and some are acquired by 
the consumer and his financier. 
132. /d. at 65-66. 
133. /d. at 66. 
134. !d. 
135. ld. 
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To attempt to resolve questions affecting the rights to possession by deter-
mining first who is the owner or by modeling the determination of possession 
after the determination of ownership can be irrelevant and quite costly. For 
example, S. J. Rotman, an Argentine authority on chattel mortgage and 
especially motor vehicle financing law, found in a 1967 study that "the very 
grave losses suffered by the Argentine motor vehicle trade" 136 (in the period 
studied) were attributable to an administrative and judicial confusion between 
the requirements of titling motor vehicles and providing notice of secured 
transactions using these vehicles as collateral. This confusion resulted in the 
Chattel Mortgage Registry's denial to issue chattel mortgage certificates until 
the titling procedure had been satisfied and vice versa. 137 Very soon, accord-
ing to this author, "hundreds of millions of pesos of chattel mortgage financ-
ing lay immobile awaiting action in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. "138 
The attempt to treat a secured transaction's recording as if it required a 
recordation of title to the chattel was responsible for the following not uncom-
mon situation observed by the author in Costa Rica in 1968: "C," a secured 
creditor, brought his security agreement for recordation to the Registry of 
Pledges on the day 1. "P," a good faith purchaser of the chattel, on day 15, 
searched the records and found no reference to the recording of C' s security 
interest. Therefore, he bought the chattel. Despite the absence of recordation 
of C' s interest, C would still prevail over P under Costa Rican Law as a result 
of Article 542 of the Costa Rican Commercial Code which established the date 
of' 'presentation" of the security agreement to the registry as the date at which 
third party rights were affected. The reason for the absence of a recordation or 
notation in the Debtor's Index of the Registry as of the date of presentation 
was that filings were treated by registry administrative rulings as if they were 
recordings of title. It was not until the agreement had been assigned for re-
cording to the responsible clerk was there a reference to the presentation of the 
security agreement entered in the index. 139 Therefore, controversies regarding 
the perfection of the security interest or the priorities among secured creditors 
could not be resolved by the notion of reliance on what appeared on record. 
Similar difficulties with reliance on registry notice are apparent in Mexican 
land registry law, especially as a result of recent decisions by the Mexican 
Supreme Court on what constitutes good faith in the,purchase of real prop-
erty. Presently, good faith requires that the third party engage in a very 
diligent if not exhaustive search of his chain of title, a highly difficult and com-
plex task even for specialists. 140 Moreover, even after the most thorough 
136. S. JULIO ROTMAN, LA BUENA FE EN LA PRENDA CON REGISTRO 37 (Buenos Aires 1967). 
137. !d. 
138. !d. 
139. 3 KOZOLCHYK & TORREALBA, supra note 23, at 32, 33-36. 
140. See, e,g., Eufrasia Rodriguez de Ibarra, Suprema Corte deJusticia, [1966jl05 Semanario 
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search, the purported third party would have to contend with a judicial doc-
trine which in effect requires him to be well versed in real property law. Since 
"ignorance of the law cannot benefit a third party . . ." HI reliance on a re-
cording which resulted from a court decision that was subsequently reversed 
could prove fatal to the rights of third party purchasers or creditors under 
Mexican decisional law. 
VII. COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND 
LATIN AMERICAN VERSIONS OF (F2) 
The reliance on the market as the preeminent standard for adjudication of 
commercial controversies increases the predictability of the outcome of 
disputes. To a layman, terms such as "reasonable," "seasonable" or "mer-
chantable" may sound vague and unpredictable. To the student of Anglo-
American judicial decisions and commercial statutory law as well as to ex-
perienced merchants, these terms have a concrete market connotation and a 
commercial reality reference. 
At its most basic level, the market standard requires that in every contract 
or transaction there be what the California Supreme Court described as "an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do 
anything which injures the right of the other to receive the benefits of the 
agreement. "142 To the extent that courts' perceptions of intended benefits 
coincide with trade usage and custom, regular market participants are able to 
predict better the outcome of their controversies. As stated by a federal court 
in a landmark 1967 decision, "good business practices should make good 
business law. " 143 
Still, uncertainty arises in three situations. The first is where the nature of 
the benefits sought by each party is unclear and the courts cannot, by relying 
on usage of trade or custom, determine whether a party is in effect getting 
something for nothing. IH If the court is unable to characterize the transaction 
51, translated in Kozolchyk, The Mexican Land Registry, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 308, 353, 355 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk], where the Court concluded: 
To avoid a presumption of irregularity (ligereza) or bad faith in the acquisition of im-
movable property, a party seeking the protection of the registry must be able to prove 
that he had exhaustively searched his chain of title. . . . Ignorance of the law is not an 
excuse for non compliance with this obligation. 
141. (1966] 105 Semanario at 95; see discussion thereof in Kozolchyk, supra note 140, at 
337-38. 
142. Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949). 
143. In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D. Ore. 1967). 
144. Assume for example that some bank customers engage in the practice of asking their 
banks to issue letters of credit payable on the presentation not of original documents, as is usual, 
but of duplicates thereof. No documents are presented by beneficiaries of the credits to the bank 
and therefore no legal basis would seem to exist for a court to decide that the bank is entitled to a 
commission for the customers' and beneficiaries' use of the credit. Yet a denial of the right to com-
mission for the mere issuance of the credit would ignore the benefit conferred upon parties who 
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as, say, a loan, a sale or a commission agency it would be pointless to ask 
sellers, borrowers or commission agents what most of them would do under 
the circumstances. The second and more common situation is where there are 
conflicting versions of the meaning, validity or efficacy of contractual terms, 
conditions or of custom and usage, as a result of the parties' membership in 
trade or professional groups which have opposing interests. For example, 
banks that handle the verification of documentary compliance in letter of 
credit transactions have views which conflict with those of insurance brokers in 
the business of issuing certain insurance documents. Accordingly, each group 
would have testified differently on the question whether an insurance "cer-
tificate" or "cover note" should be acceptable for a credit that calls for an in-
surance "policy." 145 Similarly, depending upon the side of the transaction on 
which the regular market participant finds himself, he may invoke contradic-
tory customary or usage of trade definitions for a "clean" or "stale" bill of 
lading, or even for "chicken." In such cases courts find it necessary to inter-
ject their own notions of what constitutes a fair benefit by assuming, as did 
Judge Friendly in Frigaliment Importing Co. that the parties' intent was that 
there should be a profit especially when each party is deemed to be acting with 
a view to his own advantage. 146 
It should be emphasized that even where, as in Frigaliment, "good faith" 
and "fair dealing" are used, they are not used interchangeably; good faith 
still requires that the court ascertain the true intent of the parties in light of 
what most participants in a similar transaction would have intended, 
regardless of formalistic considerations. In other words, it would have been 
most unusual for a court in the United States to disregard the testimony of a 
reliable witness as to what the parties intended simply because the contract 
was embodied in a public deed, as was done by Mexico's Supreme Court and 
state appellate courts as well as by other Latin American state appellate 
courts. 147 The contrasting attitude is strikingly illustrated by Louisiana court 
decisions on the "full proof" value and reformation of "authentic acts," 
Louisiana's counterpart to Mexico's and Latin America's public deeds. 148 In 
1958, the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Wilson v. Levy,I49 held that a party to 
agree that if payment is not made against presentation of original documents the bank's payment 
against duplicates can be counted on. For a discussion of this practice set B. KOZOLCHYK, COM· 
MERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 116-17 (1966). 
145. ld. at 428-29. 
146. See text accompanying note 68 supra. 
147. See text accompanying notes 82-89 supra. For an example of a similarly sounding Colom-
bian Supreme Court decision, see (1964] 108 Gaceta Judicial 143, in which the Court stated: 
"The document executed before a Notary Public is literal proof par excellence and constitutes the 
solemn and indispensable requisite for the formation of a contract of sale of immovable property 
in accordance with the law .... " 
148. See generally 1 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS 203-04 (1969). 
149. 234 La. 721, 101 So.2d 214 (1958). 
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a conveyance in an "authentic act" in which, by mistake or inadvertence, 
thirty more acres were included than the parties had intended, can reform the 
authentic act by proving the true intent of the parties. 150 Significantly, after 
hearing the parties' testimony, the lower court heard Ellis J. Smith, the real 
estate agent involved in the transaction, whom the court described as "one 
thoroughly familiar with the property of the vicinity. "151 Thus, even in a 
jurisdiction such as Louisiana, where courts are directed by statute to give 
"full proof' value to authentic acts, the established decisional law rule is not 
one of "strict law" but one in which "Either party is always permitted, in a 
suit between the parties to the contract, to correct any error in the instrument 
purporting to evidence the contract, so as to make it express truly and cor-
rectly the intention of the parties .... "152 
The Latin American decisions reviewed indicate that the attempt to con-
strue contractual intent do not, as a rule, rely on (F2) especially when the con-
tract or promise is embodied in a public deed. While the Supreme Court of 
Mexico in Fernando Lopez153 reversed Puebla's appellate court's decision and 
considered parol evidence on the true value of land conveyed through a 
private deed, in Gonzalez Varela154 it rejected such evidence when construing 
public deed stipulations. It could be argued that a strict or literal interpreta-
tion of the stipulations in a public deed, even though unfair from an (F2) 
standpoint, could nonetheless provide a high degree of certainty. This presup-
poses that the meaning of expressed intention is susceptible to uniform inter-
pretation, regardless of the context in which the terms were used. This is an 
altogether unwarranted presupposition in any legal transaction regardless of 
the legal system. As illustrated by Gonzalez Varela and Fernando Lopez, a term as 
seemingly unambiguous as the price of a conveyance of land becomes highly 
uncertain once couched in the context of a tax evasion inspired simulation. 
Similarly, after reading Frigaliment,155 one can no longer validly assume that 
"chicken" has the same meaning for a U.S. exporter as it does for a European 
importer. It is common for Latin American courts to use abstract or "purely 
logical" concepts or principles of interpretation instead of (F2) when they are 
unable to rely on the literal meaning of contractual terms or even when at-
tempting to construe such meaning .156 
150. !d. at 722, 101 So.2d at 215. 
151. !d. 723, 101 So.2d at 216. 
152. !d. at 215. 
153. See text accompanying note 82 supra. 
154. See text accompanying note 91 supra. 
155. See text accompanying note 68 supra. 
156. Reliance on "purely logical" concepts is illustrated in a statement attributed by the 
Argentine [1944] Repertorio La Ley 265 to the Uruguayan Tribunal de Apelacion 2° turno, 26 
dejulio de 1943: "to talk about replacing an express agreement by a tacit one is legal absurdity" 
(hablar de la sustitucion de un convenio expreso por otro tacito constituye un absurdo juridico). Implicit in this 
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The question of what is fair remuneration for making an oil well productive 
in a dispute over the meaning of an agreed upon fifty percent production 
royalty was resolved not by determining the customary methods of compensa-
tion in the oil drilling trade but by ascertaining the "strictly personal" nature 
of the services rendered and those still to be rendered under the contract. 157 It 
is also worth recalling that the Supreme Court of Mexico itself admitted that a 
very substantial part of the claim was related to services already rendered,158 
thereby impliedly conceding the irrelevance of the chosen criterion at least 
with regard to half of the cause of action. Moreover, as illustrated by the Col-
ombian Supreme Court in Compania Bogotana de Teatros S.A., 159 in some in-
stances there is not only an inconsistency between the operative facts and the 
deciding concept or principle, but also a sharp conflict between what is im-
plicit in the concept or principle as perceived by the court and fundamental 
market presuppositions. Implicit in the Colombian Supreme Court's ruling 
that due course holding does not require value is a presupposition totally at 
odds with the market. 
Market participation presupposes a giving of ascertainable value, and an 
active market is characterized precisely by the encouragement it provides to 
such a giving through the award of a preferential legal status such as that of the 
holder in due course. When courts grant the privileged status of a holder in 
due course to any holder, the giving of value and the market activity are 
discouraged. This occurs because obligors become vulnerable to unwarranted 
claims and fewer of them are willing to become makers, drawers, acceptors or 
endorsers of negotiable instruments. Therefore, such a rule is not merely a 
source of uncertainty, but is a prime candidate for instant desuetude. 
Latin American judicial and administrative reliance on title as the determi-
nant of secured and third party rights in personal property transactions breeds 
similar uncertainty where the market has made it necessary to fragment title 
into various valid and often conflicting rights to immediate possession. Not in-
frequently, judicial reliance on doctrine as a substitute for (F2) results in deci-
sions contrary to the market standard. Picado Gue"eTo v. Rojas Diaz,160 a 1965 
decision of the Costa Rican Supreme Court, exemplifies this tendency. Plain-
tiff, a highly successful attorney who had just earned a substantial fee, con-
statement is the assumption that once terms have been expressed, regardless of what the true in-
tent of the parties may be or may become, there can be no other intent, not even a superseding 
one, unless expressed as was the first. Accordingly, the existence of a true intent is subordinated 
to the form of its expression, as long as there is a writing or other formal expression of such an in-
tent. 
157. See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra. 
158. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra. 
159. See notes 128-35 supra and accompanying text. 
160. Picado Guerrero v. Rojas Dias, 1965, Sala de Casacion, reprinted in 2 KOZOLCHYK & 
TORREALBA, supra note 23, at 139. 
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tracted a well-known local broker and asked him to find a lucrative invest-
ment. The broker had been contacted previously by the holder of treasury 
bonds which offered both an attractive yield and discount. The plaintiff asked 
the defendant broker to send the bonds to the National Bank for verification of 
authenticity and when he was informed that they appeared to be authentic he 
purchased the bonds and paid the broker a commission. Shortly thereafter it 
was discovered that the bonds were a forgery. The central issue before the 
Supreme Court of Costa Rica was whether the defendant was a "commission 
agent" (comisionista) or a "broker" (corredor).161 If deemed to be a commission 
agent, he had to assume personal liability for the validity of the bonds. If 
deemed a broker, he was only an intermediary and was not liable to his pur-
chaser. In determining the defendant's status the Supreme Court said that 
defendant himself acknowledged his status as commission agent by using such 
a label in his office and letterhead. It considered evidence in the form of 
statements by leading Latin American and European commercial lawyers on 
the question, "Who is a commission agent and what is his liability as com-
pared to that of other intermediaries?" 162 and found defendant liable for 
plaintiffs losses. Significantly, however, the court attributed no value to the 
evidentiary finding that in San Jose, Costa Rica, among merchants as well as 
non-merchants the label "commission agent is used to designate a simple 
broker"163 and was used as such by the defendant in all his dealings. Thus, a 
doctrinal definition of commission agency inspired in European usages 
displaced that which prevailed in the San Jose market where the transaction 
took place. 
In concluding this comparative evaluation some clarifications are necessary. 
The first is that the reticence of Latin American courts to rely on (F2) when 
construing the intent of public deeds or formal contracts is often prompted by 
the distrust of and little weight given to parties' testimony.16+ Secondly, Latin 
American courts may well be hampered in their application of (F2) as a result 
of the peculiar perceptions of what is the market by market participants in 
Latin America. Paul Karon's recent field study on Mexico City lending prac-
tices and perceptions of fair rates on interest165 found that in response to the 
question, "What is a fair rate of interest?", most lenders replied that it was 
the "economic" rate given by supply and demand. 166 In reality however, the 
demand for credit so far outstripped its supply that there was a truly 
monopolistic method of determining rates. The rates charged by the 
161. Id. at 152. 
162. Id. at 144-46. 
163. Id. at 152, finding XI. 
164. See notes 90, 92 supra. 
165. P. Karon, Law, Fairness and Non-Institutional Credit in Mexico (1976) (unpublished 
research paper in University of Arizona, Foreign Law Collection) [hereinafter cited as Karon]. 
166. Id. at 48. 
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equivalent of the United States "personal finance" company, was generally 
based on the lender's evaluation of the borrower's ability to repay the loan. 
Typically a lender would charge pilots of an airline ten percent per month, but 
charged the mechanics and maintenance personnel of the same company only 
five percent per month because he felt that since the pilots earned more "they 
could afford to pay higher interest."167 Mutatis mutandis a large number of 
widows in the lending business would charge what the local priest suggested 
was a fair rate which would usually be substantially lower than that charged by 
male moneylenders. 16s These practices clearly do not allow for an easy deter-
mination of what most participants in the transaction with a view to their own 
advantage would regard as fair. 
Finally it should be clarified that (F2) in its United States or any other ver-
sion is not an altruistic standard. The distinction between (Fl) and (F2) is not 
merely that (Fl) protects brethren in a religious or kinship sense and (F2) pro-
tects those who participate in market transactions on a regular basis. The pro-
tection of (F2) is not the type of protection one would expect from a brother. It 
is predicated on the utilitarian perceptions of businessmen and not on the ab-
solute duties of family members. Thus, while (F2) requires disclosure of facts 
that most participants would regard as essential, it does not require, as (Fl) 
does, that the party with superior knowledge refrain from entering into a con-
tract if the other party is too weak to profit or to prevent being damaged by the 
contract. Further, while (F2) is not as limited in its availability as (Fl), its 
scope of protection is limited to market transactions involving regular par-
ticipants. Therefore, the meaning of benefits and detriments in (F2) is solely 
that which prevails among regular participants in market transactions or in 
transactions undertaken with a view to their own advantage. 
This is illustrated dramatically by recent decisions of courts in the United 
States interpreting the meaning of the warranty of merchantability in lawsuits 
brought by smokers who allegedly contracted cancer as a result of smoking 
cigarettes. The courts' definition of defective cigarettes was: "a product 
(cigarettes) that is in no way defective. They are exactly like all others of the 
particular brand and virtually the same as all other brands on the market. "169 
The (F2) detriment that plaintiff would have had to prove in an action for 
breach of merchantability as a result of the alleged defective condition was not 
the one he actually suffered as a smoker, but that which he would have suf-
fered had he been unable to sell the cigarettes as a retailer or wholesaler. 
167. Id.at49. 
168. Id. at 50. 
169. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97,110 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson,J., dissent-
ing), adopted as en bane opinion on rehearing, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam). 
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VIII. PROTOTYPE VERSIONS OF (F3): ENGLISH AND INDIAN 
USURY AND "NECESSITY" LAW 
257 
The study of English usury law reveals that well into the 16th century 
English courts, as had Roman adjudicators more than a thousand years 
earlier, distinguished the rights and duties of their own and foreign traders. 170 
The determination of when a loan was usurious in English law depended in 
many instances on whether the borrower was a foreign merchant. If he was a 
foreign merchant, he was treated as a stranger in that the courts would not in-
terfere with the collection of whatever interest rate was stated in the loan, or 
disguised loan, instrument. The White Book of the City of London (Liber-
Albus) records a typical complaint of usury by Ralph Cornwaile, an 
Englishman, against Walter Southouse, another Englishman. 171 Southouse 
defended the action by alleging what was an absolute defense, i.e., that the 
plaintiff was not the true borrower but was acting merely as a surety for the 
true borrower, Bartholomew Boseham, "a Lombard. "172 Courts' protection 
of local merchants at the expense of foreigners was so great that reportedly in 
1499 the Hansards refused to submit to the jurisdiction of English courts 
because "there might be great parcialitie in the said judges and favor in the 
examination of witnesses." 173 
A contemporary replica of the preceding English version of (F3) is apparent 
in the Indian courts' application of Hindu law to credit transactions. India is, 
in the words of a leading scholar, "a land of personal laws." 174 Brahmins, 
Buddhists, Christians, Mohammedans and Parsees have distinct laws affect-
ing every facet of life. 175 Damdupat is a principle of Hindu law which prevents 
the collection of interest on loans of money in excess, at any time, of the prin-
cipal amount of the loan. 176 As a personal law principle, Damdupat is 
unavailable to non-Hindu debtors. A non-Hindu debtor cannot invoke the 
limitation upon interest when sued by a Hindu creditor. 177 The latter is then 
free to charge to non-Hindus whatever the traffic in a Hindu jurisdiction will 
bear. 
170. W.W. BUCKLAND & A.D. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 25 (2d ed. 1965): 
"The Roman solution of the problem started from the view that no foreigner was worthy of the 
ius civile, and went on to build up a body of law to regulate the relations between Romans and 
foreigners and between one foreigner and another." 
171. LIBER ALBUS 339-44 (The White Book of the City of London) (London, H.T. Riley 
trans. 1861). 
172. The jury did not believe defendant and found that "a contract of usury had been con-
trived and made by the aforesaid Walter ... with the intent of usuriously taking from the said 
Ralph .... " !d. 
173. A. ABRAM, SOCIAL LIFE IN ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 47 (London 1909). 
174. J. M. DERRETT, RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA 39 (1968). 
175. !d. 
176. Bapuroa v. Anant Kashinath, (1946) Indian L. R. Nagpur 407,413. On Damdupat see 
generally J.M. DERRETT, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN HINDU LAW 520-24 (1963). ' 
177. See (1946) India L. R. Nagpur at 411. 
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Closely related to Damdupat in Hindu law is the principle of legal necessity; 
a principle conceived of to protect the rights of members of a family against 
frivolous dispositions of family property, even when the property is in the 
hands of a bona fide mortgagee or purchaser. According to this principle, a 
disposition of family property is valid when there is legal necessity to do so, 
and a legal necessity exists, for example, when a loan is not used for a purpose 
such as "purchasing spirituous liquors," supporting a mistress or "the vice of 
prostitution. "178 A court's finding that there was no legal necessity when the 
transaction was entered into could void the entire loan or equitably reduce its 
amount. 179 It does not matter to some Indian courts whether the creditor was 
not the original lender, mortgagee or a subsequent purchaser of the mortgage; 
if the property mortgaged was "ancestral family property," the purchaser-
mortgagee is placed under a duty to determine the actual necessity. 180 More 
often than not when the sale or mortgage is impugned by a family member 
(coparcener) the ultimate validity of the transaction will depend on the court's 
finding that the alienee "made all proper inquiries to satisfy himself of the 
truth of the representations. "181 Clearly, the protection of ancestral family 
property in Hindu law is at the expense of the innocent non-family member or 
stranger. 
IX. COMMON CONTEMPORARY VERSIONS OF (F3) 
A. Anglo-American Law 
Unlike the English usury and Hindu Damdupat and necessity decisions, the 
most common contemporary versions of (F3) do not apply the stranger treat-
ment to foreigners or non-members of the family or religion, however 
widespread such a basis of adjudication may be in informal administrative or 
extra-judicial decision-making. 182 
The most common contemporary version of (F3) results from the courts' 
equation of occasional and regular participants in market transactions. Occa-
sional participants are those who lack the market experience, knowledge of the 
178. Rajeshwar v. Nangiram Gangabishan, [1932] 142 Indian Cases 242, 244 (C.] .C. 
Nagpur). 
179. Ram Khelawan v. Ram Nares Singh, [1919]51 Indian Cases 52 (Allahabad H.C.). 
180. For an interesting discussion on the nature of custom and inalienable family property in 
Hindu law, see Protap Chandra v. Jagadish Chandra, [1925] Indian L. R. Calcutta 118, 125, cited 
in Ram Khelawan, [1919]51 Indian Cases at 52, wherein the court stated: "It is incumbent upon 
the mortgagee suing to enforce his mortgage to prove not only the existence of the family neces-
sity, but that there was necessity for borrowing at an onerous rate of interest." 
181. Bunku Behari De v. Bissewar Lal, [1923] A.I.R. 575, 576 (Calcutta S.C. 1923) 
182. An (F3) version of adjudication which is considerably widespread in contemporary infor-
mal administrative or extrajudicial decision-making in some developing countries is that of re-
quiring a foreigner or stranger to pay a gratuity or bribe for adjudications to which family 
members or friends or compatriots of the adjudicator are entitled to as a matter of course. 
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terms of the contract or bargaining power to obtain an exchange of values 
which most regular participants would regard as fair. By assuming that these 
strangers are regular and knowledgeable participants, they are denied the 
benefits of (F1) and (F2). For it is assumed that they willingly entered into 
these transactions. Fairness then becomes the plain meaning of contracts 
regardless of how one-sided or exploitive they are. L 'Estrange v. Graucob,183 an 
English 1934 Kings Bench decision, provides a good illustration of this version 
of (F3). Plaintiff owned a suburban cafe and the defendant was a London 
manufacturer and seller of automatic slot machines for the sale of cigarettes. 
Defendant's agents met with plaintiff at her stepmother's to discuss the sale of 
a slot machine. Plaintiff was persuaded to buy the machine and defendant's 
agent produced a printed sales form labelled" sales agreement. " In very small 
print the agreement contained the stipulation that "any express or implied, 
condition or statement or warranty statutory or otherwise not stated herein is 
hereby excluded." 18+ Plaintiff paid an installment of the purchase price and 
discovered that the machine was inoperative. Plaintiff contended that she was 
induced to sign the contract by the misrepresentation that it was a mere order 
form and that she knew nothing of the small print conditions of the sale. The 
lower court judge held for the plaintiff; but, on appeal, the Kings Bench Divi-
sion held that there was no evidence of misrepresentation before the lower 
court, and, equating plaintiffs allegation to an imputation of fraud, it held: 
"the plaintiff having put her signature to the document ... cannot be heard 
to say that she is not bound by the terms of the document because she had not 
read them. "185 Maugham, L. J., stated that he regretted his decision but, be-
ing bound by "legal rules," he could not decide otherwise. 186 He concluded 
that it was irrelevant that plaintiff did not read, or hear of, the parts of the 
sales document which are in small print, and that document should have effect 
according to its terms.187 He added that he wished that the contract had been 
in a simpler and more usual form, and that it was unfortunate that the impor-
tant clause excluding conditions and warranties was in such small print, but 
that the appeal was proper. 188 
It is important to note how the majority opinion in this case distinguished 
the rule in the "railway ticket" cases from its own rule in the instant case: 
In cases in which the contract is contained in a railway ticket or other 
unsigned document it is necessary to prove that an alleged party was 
183. [1934J 2 K.B. -394. 
184. Id. at 4-02. 
185. Id. at 404. 
186. /d. 
187. Id.at 406-07. 
188. /d. at 4-05, 407. 
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aware, or ought to have been aware, of its terms and conditions. 
These cases have no application when the document has been 
signed. When a document containing contractual terms is signed, 
then in the absence of fraud, or I will add misrepresentation, the 
party signing is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he had 
read the document or not .... 189 
Since an awareness of the terms of the contract is required by the court in the 
railway ticket cases and is dispensed with in the case in which the purchaser of 
the goods has signed the contract, the purchaser's signature carries the same 
weight as an awareness of the terms of the contract in the eyes of the court. 190 
However, in order to presume that a signature implies such an awareness, the 
court had to assume that either plaintiff was actually aware of the contents of 
the contract, which was inconsistent with the court's own version of the facts, 
or that plaintiff constructively knew about such contents. This constructive 
knowledge, however, can be imputed only to a regular or knowledgeable pur-
chaser of automatic slot machines. Only regular participants in that trade 
could be judged to be aware of conditions and disclaimers presumably so com-
mon as not requiring a clear statement or a readable type. This unwarranted 
assumption therefore resulted in an (F3) treatment. While a brotherly mer-
chant would have refrained from such a transaction and a regular participant 
would have required that a product sold on what amounts to a highly risky or 
"as is" basis bear a market price consistent with such a basis, the plaintiff, as a 
stranger, was denied the benefits of such bargaining. As stated by Official 
Comment 4- to V.C.C. § 2-313, in determining what the parties have agreed 
upon "good faith is a factor and consideration should be given to the fact that 
the probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged for a 
pseudo-obligation.' '191 
The determination of what would have been the presumed bargain between 
regular participants in the transaction while ostensibly searching for the "root 
of the contract" or for the "fundamental terms of the contract," prompted 
other English courts to disregard the L 'Estrange decision. 192 In Karsales Ltd. v. 
189. /d. a, 'i03. 
190. An interesting parallel to the King's Bench "knowledge by signature approach" is the 
ritualistic solution provided by the Italian Civil Code of 1942, Article 1341. CODICE CIVILE art. 
1341 (Italy 1942). This code requires a specific approval (usually by signature or initial) for "1. 
conditions limiting liability of a party who has prepared the general conditions, ... " On this ar-
ticle and its interpretation in Italian law see Gorla, Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in Italian 
Law, 11 AM.]. COMPo LAW 1 (1962). 
191. V.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4. 
192. Notably, see Glynn V. Margetson & Co., [1893) A.C. 351 (where it was held that if a 
clause was inconsistent with the main purpose of the contract that clause must be rejected). More 
recently, see Alexander V. Railway Executive, (1951) 2 K.B. 882 (where Lord Devlin (then 
Devlin, ].) coined the term "fundamental breach"); and Harbuu's Plasticine Ltd. V. Wayne 
Tank and Pump Co. Ltd., [1970)1. Q.B. 447. But if. Coote, The Effect of Discharge by Breach on Ex-
ception Clauses, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 221 (1970). 
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Wallis,193 a standard hire purchase (conditional sale) clause stating, "No con-
ditional warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy, or as to its age, condition or 
fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or implied herein,"194 was 
disregarded by the court where the vehicle in question was a mere shell. In the 
court's language: 
Exemption clauses do not avail him when he is guilty of a breach 
which goes to the root of the contract. The thing to do is to look at 
the contract apart from the exempting clauses and see what are the 
terms, express or implied, which impose an obligation on the party. 
If he has been guilty of a breach of those obligations in a respect 
which goes to the root of the contract, he cannot rely on the exemp-
tion clause .... 195 
The basic problem of treating contractually weak or inexperienced parties 
as if they were experienced regular market participants was perceived by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in New York Central R.R. v. Lockwood,196 an 1873 deci-
sion. As stated by Justice Bradley: 
The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality. 
The latter is only one individual of a million. He cannot afford to 
haggle or stand out, and seek redress in the courts. His business will 
not admit such a course. He prefers rather to accept any bill of lad-
ing or sign any paper the carrier presents; often indeed without 
knowing what one or the other contains. In most cases he has no 
alternative but to do this or abandon his business .... 197 
In 1941, Justice Frankfurter expressed a similar view in his dissent in United 
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,198 questioning; "Does any principle in our 
law have more universal application than the doctrine that courts will not en-
force transactions in which the relative positions of the parties are such that 
one has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities of the other?"199 
Yet in 1960, Karl Llewellyn assessed United States courts' attitudes toward 
what he termed' 'form pad" contracts200 as follows: 
For the story is quick to tell, though the cases must run into the 
thousands and with no reckonability anywhere in sight. Unpredic-
tably, they read the document for what it says, drop a word about 
freedom of contract, or about opportunity to read, or improvident 
193. [1956] 2 All E.R. 866, 1 W.L.R. 936 (C.A.). 
194. [d. at 868, 1 W.L.R. at 937-38. 
195. [d. at 868-69, 1 W.L.R. at 940-41. 
196. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873). 
197. /d. at 379. 
198. 315 U.S. 289 (1942). 
199. [d. at 326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
200. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362-71 (1960). 
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use of the pen, or about powerlessness of the court to do more than to 
regret, or the like, and proceed to spit the victim for the barbecue. 
With equal unpredictability they see the lopsided document as inde-
cent and evade it .... 201 
Are Llewellyn's and Frankfurter's assessments reconcilable? Reconciliation 
is an order when one understands that Justice Frankfurter's principle "of 
universal application" was, despite appearances, truly addressed to the 
"limited" universe of actual or potential regular participants in the market 
place as suppliers of goods and services, buyers thereof and ultimately, also, as 
potential competitors of either or both. The plaintiff in Bethlehem Steel was, 
after all, the United States Government and the gist of its cause of action was 
defendant's taking advantage of its market position and of wartime duress. 
While Justice Frankfurter may have been correct when chastising his col-
leagues for their ironic denial of the likelihood of governmental duress,202 he 
himself could not have denied the regularity of the United States Government 
participation in the procurement business. 
In fact where contractual onesidedness is concerned, courts in the United 
States until quite recently, have been much more willing to aid the actual or 
potential regular market participant in distress than the occasional partici-
pant. This attitude was influenced greatly no doubt by the turn of the century 
enactment of federal anti-trust and unfair trade legislation, followed by 
widespread state statutory emulation. The consumer protection trend, as in-
dicated earlier in connection with (F1), is of much more recent vintage having 
come into being in the 1960s after Llewellyn's assessment. 
B. German Law 
One of the most significant findings in Dawson's lucid account of pre-
Second World War German fair exchange law was that the ideal of a fair ex-
change was inseparably related to the problems of disparity in bargaining 
power. 203 And even though only three types of disparity were recognized in 
the German Civil Code of 1900, i.e., necessity, thoughtlessness and inex-
perience, courts were given considerable latitude in defining these terms. 204 A 
temporary economic stringency, if sufficiently severe, might, in the eyes of 
German courts, destroy the bargaining power of a person possessed of con-
siderable financial resources. 205 A simple workman, as opposed to an ex-
perienced farmer-merchant, was held sufficiently inexperienced to avoid a 
purchase of fertilizer at an excessive price. 206 
201. /d. at 364. 
202. 315 U.S. 330-31 (Frankfurter, ]., dissenting). 
203. Dawson, supra note 44, at 62. 
204. /d. 
205. /d. 
206. Id. at 63 n.I77. 
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In addition to the above cases of "subjective lesion," Dawson found other 
decisions predicated on Article 138 of the German Civil Code prohibiting con-
tracts in conflicts with "good morals" or on Article 242 requiring good faith in 
the performance of contracts. 207 Restraints on retailers' economic freedom im-
posed by the manufacturers-wholesalers of beer, 208 transfers of all of the deb-
tor's working assets as security to his creditor209 and harsh stipulations for 
penalties or forfeitures,21o among others, were held to be in the nature of 
Knebelungsvertrag (which Dawson translates as "a throttling contract") by 
which the power of capital was used to enslave the energies of the economic in-
ferior. 211 
A post-World War II study by Lenhoff indicates that if anything German 
courts have broadened the scope of their findings of inequality: 
A term and condition which a customer (who is neither a merchant 
nor a member of a class which may be deemed familiar with such a 
term because of longer business relations or particular business ex-
perience) might not reasonably expect to find in print on documents 
will be thrown out by a court. 212 
C. Latin American Law 
As indicated earlier in the discussion of (Fl), despite the availability of 
statutory rules quite similar to those used by German courts to insure a fair ex-
change and to redress the inequality of bargaining power, Mexican courts 
have seldom used these provisions. 213 Not only are the decisions based on 
"subjective lesion" very few and highly restricted in nature, but decisions 
utilizing the "good faith" or "good morals" principles in instances of ex-
ploitation of a contractual advantage are equally rare. Argentine courts, on 
the other hand, seem more willing to evaluate the effects of a gross dispropor-
tion of bargaining power in "adhesion" contracts. As stated by an Argentine 
appellate judge: 
In our law, the absence of regulation of contracts of adhesion does 
not prevent the judicial finding of the objective-subjective lesion 
foreseen by Article 954 of the Civil Code especially where there are 
terms or conditions which the adhering party could not have found 
207. /d. at 64-69. 
208. Id. at 65. 
209. Id. at 66. 
210. /d. 
211. According to Dawson, the concept of Knebelungsvertrag "was used to invalidate an agree-
ment between father and daughter, by which the daughter conferred on the father a complete 
power of disposition of all her property." Id. at 67-68. 
212. Lenoff, Contracts D'Adhesion in GtrmlJn and Austrian Law, 1956 A.B.A. COM. REP. COMPo L. 
121, 124. 
213. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra. 
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out about even by employing due diligence. [Neither does our law 
prevent] a reading in favor of the adhering party when the stipula-
tions are unclear. 214 
It should be noted, however, that the court conditioned the finding of lesion 
upon an absence of the knowledge obtainable by the employment of due 
diligence. This condition brings this Argentine decision closer to the King's 
Bench decision in L 'Estrange2 15 than to the German decisions reviewed by 
Dawson and Lenhoff. 216 
An additional difference between German and United States decisional law 
on the one hand and Latin American decisional on the other is that Latin 
American anti-trust and unfair competition law is virtually in its infancy. 
Thus the weaker market participant is frequently at the mercy of the stronger 
one. As is apparent in a study by Professor Furnish on the enforcement of 
Chilean anti-trust law, 217 even in a jurisdiction where an "anti-monopoly" 
statute was enacted and an administrative machinery was set up to enforce it, 
restraints of retail trade comparable to those imposed upon German beer ven-
dors at the turn of the century have gone unredressed. 218 
x. OTHER (F3) VERSIONS 
(F3) results not only from an unwarranted equation between regular and 
occasional participants in market transactions, but also from a failure to apply 
(F2) to participants in contractual and third party transactions. From an (F2) 
vantage point the purchaser or mortgagee of Mexican real property, who 
relies on a recording in the land registry which shows his grantor as having 
good title but fails to discover an infirmity that could only have been 
discovered by a knowledgeable and exhaustive search, is a stranger. 219 The 
Costa Rican purchaser or mortgagee of personal property who advanced value 
214. Oscar Avila v. El Roll S.A., CN Civil, Sala C, 30 de septiembre de 1975, [1976] II La 
Ley 127, 131. This case involved the sale of a flat on a "projected" price basis inserted in a stand-
ard form (boleto) type of contract. See also Gonzalez Betancourt v. Julio E. Gomez S.R.L., CN 
Paz, Sala IV, 4 de julio de 1952, [1953] 67 La Ley 423. But if. Ponce Roldan v. Toscani, 
Suprema Corte de Tucuman, set 1, [1944]35 La Ley 792 (where an adhesion contract requiring 
the new concessionaire of a municipal service to pay severance owed by a former concessionaire 
was upheld). Of special interest in this case is the fact that the defendant concessionaire was at-
tempting to avoid being treated as a merchant, presumably because in an environment which was 
rapidly turning highly protective of labor claims, merchants would likely be saddled with (FJ) 
duties toward their employees. The key factual finding in this case, however, was that in the con-
cession deed there appeared an account labelled "severance pay expenses" which the court 
assumed referred to the labor law obligations claimed by plaintiffs. Id. at 793. 
215. See text accompanying note 183 supra. 
216. See text accompanying notes 203-12 supra. 
217. Furnish, Chilean Antitrust Law, 19 AMJ. COMPo L. 464 (1971). 
218. /d. at 473-88 (especially the discussion of the FlOUT Milling Industry case). 
219. See note 140 supra and accompanying text. 
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after determining the absence of an adverse recording in the Registry of 
Pledges, only to be outranked by another purchaser or mortgagee whose 
"title" had been "presented" (but not recorded) earlier, also is treated as a 
stranger. 220 Both parties advanced value which most participants would have 
deemed sufficient for the acquisition of rights, both relied on what most par-
ticipants would have regarded as sufficient notice, and yet neither was pro-
tected. 
Mutatis mutandis, as a result of the unwillingness of Latin American courts to 
apply (F2) to relationships such as that between a minority stockholder and 
the corporation, this market participant is similarly treated as a stranger. 221 
Finally, (F3) can result also from a misapplication of (Fl) when a third party, 
without involvement or knowledge in an underlying contractual relationship, 
is made responsible for the contractual and extracontractual (Fl) duties of one 
of the parties to that contract. This situation is likely to arise in jurisdictions 
where the protection of consumers or weak parties totally overrides considera-
tions of contractual privity. An extreme but nonetheless helpful example of a 
misapplication of(Fl) resulting in (F3) is provided by a jury award in a 1977 
Texas County court decision, Insurance Agency Managers v. Gonzalez. 222 
Simplified, the facts are the following: B, a consumer-borrower procured a 
home improvement loan from L, a commercial lender, in order to finance a 
construction contract with C, a builder. I, an insurer, provided L with a credit 
policy that guaranteed payment of B' s loan in the event of default. B defaulted 
on the loan alleging that C had improperly performed his construction con-
tract and that L should not have paid C. I paid L the amount lent to Band 
sued B as a holder-indorsee of B's promissory note to L. B counterclaimed 
alleging the underlying breach of contract and also L's violation of the Truth-
in-Lending Act. B won both on his defense and counterclaim and despite the 
fact that B's note was for $6,000, the jury awarded B $14.000 against 1.223 
From an (F2) vantage point, I's liability, if any, would have been related to 
his having appropriated value from L or B in gross disproportion to that which 
he had contributed. In the absence of any such appropriation by I, I's liability 
to B, for a sum far in excess of that evidenced in the note, is reminiscent of the 
"stranger" treatment given to foreign merchants in medieval England. 224 
220. See note 139 supra and accompanying text. 
221. For an illustration of the treatment of minority stockholders in Costa Rican law, see 
Kozolchyk, Toward a Theory of Law in Economic Deotlopment: The Costa Rican USAID-ROCAP Law 
Reform Project, 1971 LAW & SOC. ORDER 681, 710-13; see also Kozolchyk, Commercial Law 
Recodification and Economic Development in Latin America, 4 LAW. AMERICAS 189, 192 (1972) (where 
Colombian corporate abuses of minority rights and legislative responses thereto are described). 
222. Insurance Agency Managers v. Gonzalez, No. 289985 (Harris County Ct., Tex., flied 
Dec. 8, 1977). 
223. [d. 
224. See notes 171, 173 supra and accompanying text. 
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XI. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION 
The main difference between the historical or prototype versions and the 
common contemporary versions of (F3) is the following: The prototype ver-
sion deliberately singles out the stranger, whether family member or a 
foreigner, for the stranger treatment. By contrast, the contemporary versions 
apply the stranger standard as a result of an unwarranted equation between 
market and nonmarket participants and by failing to apply (F2) to market 
transactions where parties relied on such a standard. This failure could be 
purely the result of the courts' reliance on abstract reasoning inconsistent with 
(F2), such as with contractual and third party rights decisions by Latin 
American courts, or it could be the product ofthe courts' desire to protect con-
sumers or weak parties at the expense of third parties as with the Texas Coun-
ty Court jury award in Gonzalez. 
From a comparative legal standpoint it is apparent that due to the erratic 
application of (F2), and to the absence of consumer protection and anti-trust 
legislation and court decisions, (F3) is a much more widespread standard of 
adjudication in Latin America than it is in Germany or the United States. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The preceding examination of commercial decisions has served the purpose 
of identifying what courts deem as fair in commercial adjudication. It is clear 
that the reliance on the three identified standards of models is not prompted by 
the jurisdiction's allegiance to the "civil" as opposed to the "common law" 
type of decision-making. The perception of what is a fair treatment of a third-
party purchaser or mortgagee in Mexican land registry law decisions is quite 
unlike those in the civil law jurisdictions which served as Mexico's legislative 
models. It is much closer to that in the Hindu law decisions based on "legal 
nec.essity. " Court attitudes toward fairness proved more important than the 
applicable norm's original legislative purpose or pedigree. 
The article demonstrates that the key judicial attitudes are those toward 
membership or participation in two seminal associations. The first is the 
brotherly association, which is intended primarily for the preservation of the 
family, understood in terms of kinship, religious or political affiliation. The 
brotherly relationship imposes the highest conceivable duties upon the 
brethren-participants and very few if any duties toward non-brethren or par-
ticipants. The second is the trade or market type of association, which imposes 
lesser duties upon its members or participants than does the brotherly associa-
tion. However, it broadens the criteria which allow participation in the pro-
tected relationship so as to include anyone capable of exchanging value, with 
value being defined by participants themselves. The relationship with a 
stranger imposes no duties on the participants of the brotherly or market 
associations toward the stranger, but because of the greater ease with which 
one can become a participant in a market than in a brotherly type of associa-
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tion, the market aSSOciatIOn has fewer strangers than does the brotherly 
association. Thus, fairness in commercial adjudication can be defined as a 
criterion of adjudication based upon the duties borne by the participants in the 
brotherly or market type of association as a result of their participation. 
The fact that the most common contemporary versions of (Fl) require the 
highest duties from trustees, attorneys or merchants with superior knowledge 
or bargaining power instead of from tribal brethren is no doubt yet another 
confirmation of Summer Maine's asserted progression from "status" to 
"contract"225 or Tonnies' from Gemeinschaft to Gesellshaft.226 Similar confirma-
tion is found in the fact that the most common stranger in the reviewed com-
mercial law adjudication is no longer the foreigner but the occasional and 
weak participant in market transactions and in the prevalence of (F2) in 
jurisdictions with developed market economies. But while the progression 
from status to contract is borne out by this article it is also true that if status is 
defined not merely as membership in a family or tribe, but as the participation 
in any of the basic relationships that characterize the two associations, status 
then continued to be the crucial factor in arriving at a fair decision. 
The fact that courts in developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica and Mexico tend to apply (F3) to market transactions 
either by choice or by not applying (F2) with greater frequency than courts in 
Germany and the United States is, in itself, significant. However, a showing 
of cause and effect relationship between development and commercial 
decision-making trends would require much more data than presently 
available. Nevertheless, the connection between (F3) and a weak or inefficient 
market is obvious: the larger the number of strangers, the smaller the number 
of willing participants in market transactions. (F3) therefore can be regarded 
as a blueprint for underdevelopment. It is apparent also that where there is a 
widespread utilization of (F2) accompanied by a reliance on (Fl) to encourage 
participation in fiduciary relationships there is a greater willingness to par-
ticipate in ordinary market as well as in fiduciary relationships. 
The preceding conclusions highlight the value of the identified standards or 
models of fairness. First of all they serve as valid, albeit synthetic, descriptions 
of the determinants of commercial adjudication in the developing and 
developed market economies studied. Therefore, they can be of considerable 
assistance in understanding what courts do and why they do it. Such an 
understanding facilitates a more orderly and consistent application of rules 
and principles of interpretation. Moreover, by becoming increasingly aware 
of the intrinsic limitations of eacb standard and of their necessary interaction, 
the legal analyst will be able to formulate concepts and rules more consistent 
with relationships essential in the furtherance of the seminal associations. 
225. S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163-65 (10th ed. 1963). 
226. F. TONNIES, GEMEINSCHAFTUNDGESELLSHAFT(1887), as translated, C. P. LUMMIS, COM-
MUNITY AND SOCIETY (1963). 
